Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-239
Wednesday
13 December 1995

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-239 *13 December 1995*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UN Head Recommends 9,300 Troops for E. Slavonia *[AFP]* 1

BULGARIA

Military Investigating Theft of Kalashnikovs *[Sofia Radio]* 2
BZNS Leader Backs Zhelev To Run for 2d Term *[Sofia Radio]* 2
Kozloduy's 1995 Electricity Production Reported *[Sofia Radio]* 2

CZECH REPUBLIC

Zieleniec Cited on Business Links to Yugoslavia *[Prague Radio]* 3
Deputy Minister Views Defense Sector Issues *[RESPEKT 4-10 Dec]* 3

SLOVAKIA

Meciar, Bulgaria's Videnov on Presidency, NATO *[PRAVDA 9 Dec]* 6
Meciar Ambition To Lead EU Associate Members *[PRAVDA 11 Dec]* 6
Meciar Interviewed on Achievements, Tasks *[Bratislava Radio]* 7
Ministry Clarifies Sestak Statement on Treaty *[PRAVDA 8 Dec]* 8
'High-Ranking' Source Reports 'Purges' in SIS *[SME 11 Dec]* 9
Article Berates Soros's 'Open Societies' *[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA 7 Dec]* 9
Gen Vestenicky Hopes To Sell Tanks to Malaysia *[PRAVDA 9 Dec]* 12

HUNGARY

New Air Defense Chief on Tasks, Reorganization *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 8 Dec]* 13
Minister Discusses Mass Impoverishment *[MAGYAR NEMZET 9 Dec]* 13
FKGP Continues To Lead Party Popularity List *[NEPSZABADSAG 11 Dec]* 14

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Izetbegovic Says 'No Negotiations' in Paris *[Sarajevo Radio]* 16
Calls Referendum 'Farce' *[AFP]* 16
Silajdzic Dismisses Pale Serbs' 'Referendum' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 16
Constituent Assembly Deputies Debate Dayton Accord *[Editorial Report]* 17
Reserves Right To Void Accord *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
Officials Consider Implications of Dayton Accord 20
Federation Minister Prlic *[DNEVNI AVAZ 2 Dec]* 20
Croat Assembly Leader Bender *[VECERNJI LIST 8 Dec]* 21
Ambassador to Croatia Trnka *[LJILJAN 29 Nov]* 24
Pilots' Release Described as 'Goodwill' Gesture *[Banja Luka TV]* 28
Serbs Expect French Support *[AFP]* 28
SPS Said 'Prompting' Serbs To Leave Sarajevo *[NASA BORBA 12 Dec]* 29
Serbs Hold Referendum on Status of Sarajevo 29
Right to Self-Determination *[SRNA]* 29
Political Resistance to Accord *[SRNA]* 30

Overwhelming Vote Against Accord *[SRNA]* 30

CROATIA

Railroads Demand $37 Million in Transit Fees *[AFP]* 31
'Peaceful' Reintegration of Slavonia Doubted *[SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 11 Dec]* 31
Arkan's Force Might Be Part of Slavonia Police *[NASA BORBA 12 Dec]* 32

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ismail: Bulgarian Army Combat Readiness Heightened *[SRNA]* 34
Delegation Meets Bosnian Ambassador in Ljubljana *[MIC]* 34
Slovene Partners Sought for B-H Reconstruction *[MIC]* 34
Zagreb Cancels Meeting With Construction Minister *[MIC]* 34
Assembly Deputy Chairman Favors Strong Opposition *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 10 Dec]* 34
Commentary Views 'Apathy' in By-Elections *[PULS 8 Dec]* 38
Government Announces Revisions to Customs Tariffs *[MIC]* 39
'Massive' Brain Drain 'Very Serious Problem' *[MIC]* 40

POLAND

Troops in Bosnia Not Receiving War Benefits *[SZTANDAR 11 Dec]* 42
Communique on Delaying NATO Expansion Viewed *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 8-10 Dec]* 42
Walesa To Reveal Oligarchy's Foreign Connections *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 13 Dec]* 43
Danuta Waniek Appointed Head of Chancellery *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 12 Dec]* 43
Opposition on Boycotting Kwasniewski Inauguration *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 12 Dec]* 43
Poll Shows Kwasniewski Would Win Elections Again *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 11 Dec]* 44
Oleksy on New Appointments, Relations in Coalition *[TRYBUNA 11 Dec]* 45
Right-Wing Bloc Formation Chances Viewed *[WPROST 10 Dec]* 48

ROMANIA

Melescanu Statement on Leaving for Peace Conference *[Bucharest Radio]* 51
Cabinet Meeting Examines Economic Issues *[Bucharest Radio]* 51
Interior, Defense Ministries' Budgets 'Disastrous' *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 7 Dec]* 52
Iliescu Urges Nation to 'Unity' on National Day *[DI' 'INEATA 7 Dec]* 52
UDMR Reclaims Confiscated Church Property *[ADEVARUL 6 Dec]* 53
PSM Head: Quadripartite Accord Never Functioned *[Bucharest Radio]* 54

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Interior Minister on Kosovo, Foreign Espionage *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 4 Dec]* 55

Serbia

Orthodox Church Warns of Mass Exodus From Bosnia *[AFP]* 57
Commentary on Plans To Build New 'Serb Sarajevo' *[NASA BORBA 11 Dec]* 57

Montenegro

'Warmongering Propaganda' by Pale TV Criticized *[MONITOR 8 Dec]* 58

Vojvodina

Associations Sign Manifesto Calling For Autonomy *[POLITIKA 8 Dec]* 58

UN Head Recommends 9,300 Troops for E. Slavonia

AU1312080595 Paris AFP in English 0303 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] United Nations, Dec 12 (AFP)—UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali recommended Tuesday [12 December] that the Security Council authorize 9,300 troops to implement a peace agreement for Croatia's region of eastern Slavonia.

The secretary general, in a report obtained by AFP, set out two options for the force—one being a coalition of member states attached to the NATO-led coalition in Bosnia, and the other being a force under United Nations control.

He said his preference was to have the troops under the command of the Implementation Force (IFOR) being set up to take over from UN peackeepers in Bosnia, but said "some member states" have requested UN control.

"I acknowledge that the United Nations would face great difficulty in assembling and deploying such a force in the time-frame envisaged by the parties," Butrus-Ghali wrote.

"I also continue to have reservations about the present ability of the United Nations to undertake an enforcement operation of this nature," he said.

The force must have the right under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "to take the necessary action to maintain peace and security, must be sufficiently credible to deter attack from any side and must be capable of defending itself," Butrus-Ghali's report said.

Recalling the failure of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians in Bosnia's safe areas such as Srebrenica because not enough troops were sent to do the job, Butrus-Ghali said "the concept of deterrence by mere presence...would be no likelier to succeed on this occasion."

The Security Council will make the final decision about putting the forces under UN or IFOR direction. Butrus-Ghali recommended 9,300 troops, plus 2,000 logistic support personnel.

UN officials anticipated difficulty in getting troops to serve in the volatile region, but said U.S. diplomats were working on recruiting troop-contributing countries.

Butrus-Ghali also asked the council to set up the civilian aspects of the Transitional Council and local Implementation Committee to oversee the transfer of eastern Slavonia, now controlled by Serbs, to Croatia.

An accord agreeing to the changeover and set up of the force to oversee it was signed one month ago.

Butrus-Ghali said Chapter VII force is necessary because it would be "unwise" to assume that just because Belgrade and Zagreb had signed the agreement "that compliance will be readily forthcoming."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Military Investigating Theft of Kalashnikovs

AU1212203495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Report by correspondent Angel Shoylev]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Military Prosecutor's Office is mounting an investigation into the disappearance at the end of last week of 11 Kalashnikov submachine guns from a secret military facility near Sandanski. The investigators will question Sergeant Georgi Nedelchev, the officer on duty on the night of 9 December, who may be charged with neglect of duty. Tomorrow Nedelchev will be transferred from the hospital in Dupnitsa to the Military Medical Academy.

The military prosecutors denied reports that have appeared in the mass media that secret materials were removed from the base.

BZNS Leader Backs Zhelev To Run for 2d Term

AU1112184595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1800 GMT 11 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference in Plovdiv Anastasiya Mozer, chief secretary of the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union], said that differences of opinion existed in her organization regarding Zhelyu Zhelev's candidature in the next presidential elections. She said that the BZNS Ruling Council was to make the final decision on the matter.

In Mozer's view, the incumbent president is a unifying and balancing political figure, who possesses the necessary international authority.

With regard to the grain crisis, Anastasiya Mozer said that the government as a whole was to blame and that the Agricultural Minister should not be made a sacrificial lamb.

Kozloduy's 1995 Electricity Production Reported

AU1112183595 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 11 Dec 95

[Report by correspondent Veronika Pantaleeva]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the first 11 months of 1995, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant produced 15.357 billion kilowatt-hours [kwh] of electricity. In November alone, the plant generated 1.278 billion kwh of power.

The Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 6 Reactor Units are operating at full capacity, while the 1,000-megawatt No. 5 Unit, which is due to be reconnected in parallel with the national grid on 15 December, following completion of planned maintenance work, is operating at its minimum controllable output. The No. 4 Nuclear Reactor is shut down for maintenance and refuelling.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Zieleniec Cited on Business Links to Yugoslavia

LD1212151595 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A business monitoring mission will leave for Belgrade tomorrow. It is composed of representatives of the most important Czech companies. They were received today by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec. In an interview with Czech Radio, the minister spoke about the revival of relations with that region:

[Begin Zieleniec recording] It is very important to make contacts with the Republic of Yugoslavia once the United Nations has lifted the embargo. This region used to be a very important market for us—in fact, our third-largest market. In the past, our firms supplied this region with almost everything. It is important to continue this tradition and to make the best use of the fact that the Czech Republic has a good reputation in the entire region of former Yugoslavia.

During the war we tried to conduct a policy that would not result in antagonistic relations with either of the [successor] countries. In my view, we have succeeded in this. I hope that our businessmen will use to their advantage the situation created for them by Czech foreign policy. [end recording]

Deputy Minister Views Defense Sector Issues

AU1212171795 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 4-10 Dec 95 No 49 p 12

[Interview with Czech Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas by Jaroslav Spurny and Zbynek Petracek in Prague on 24 November: "I Spoiled My Eyes in the Service"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [RESPEKT] Last week, the government approved the deployment of our unit in Bosnia. What benefit is there in this decision?

[Necas] The main reason for this—and this is no cliche—is to assume our responsibility for what is happening only several hundred kilometers away from Prague. That we will be there with NATO is only secondary. We will get firsthand experience of their operational approach, and our officers will establish contacts. We will cooperate in the areas of communication, command, and control of the units. It will be a great school for the soldiers. They will gain self-assurance.

[RESPEKT] They may get self-assurance. Are you, however, aware of the risks? Dead, wounded... Will you be able to drum up enough volunteers? Are you certain that we will meet the required qualifications?

[Necas] We have spent dozens and hundreds of hours in planning and preparing this operation. We have weighed all of the risks, and I am convinced that we will find enough volunteers and that there will be plenty of choice. It will be a quality unit.

I Will Not Cocoon

[RESPEKT] More than 100,000 people work in your sector. With a great simplification, we arrive at the figure of one drafted soldier per one clerk and one officer.

[Necas] That is so. Without ever getting out of the barracks or offices, without firing a single shot, the defense sector spends more than half of its budget on salaries, social insurance, pensions, and other compensation. The only chance of saving is to reduce the number of personnel.

[RESPEKT] The Defense Ministry employs more than 58,000 people, of which 20,000 are officers, 10,000 warrant officers, and the rest—28,000—clerks. That is a shocking figure.

[Necas] We have many institutions, offices, and even units that are superflu[illegible]nd do not benefit the troops at all. If they ceased to exist, it would not harm but, rather, benefit the Army.

[RESPEKT] The government tasked your ministry with submitting new material on the Army by mid-December. At the same time, it took almost two years to prepare the original material. Can you manage to prepare something meaningful in just a single month?

[Necas] All we can prepare by mid-December is basically a concept for the concepts, or an outline of outlines. For myself, however, I have much more specific ideas. I believe that a lot has been done. We can brush up some good ideas that have not been implemented yet. Of course, it will be a big thing, but the Army clearly must change—we have a heavy tank army with a large number of men, and we need a smaller, very mobile force.

[RESPEKT] Most of your predecessors came with great ideas, but they all eventually "consolidate." Do you believe you can resist it?

[Necas] I use the term "cocoon" rather than "consolidate," to set like jelly and lose one's agility. I have numerous defense mechanisms against it. First, I am dissatisfied by nature. I am a person, who simply is constantly and strongly motivated, whose intrinsic aggressiveness drives him forward. Second, I have friends in politics who are very open with me, and if I began to act as if I were set in jelly, they would let me know in no uncertain terms.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[RESPEKT] Like Army Chief of Staff Nekvasil, for instance, or the once defense minister, Dobrovsky, you are of the opinion that the basis for compatibility with NATO is troops who know a foreign language and the Western military strategy and arms. Most Czech soldiers fall short in this respect. How fast will this change?

[Necas] Yes, I am one of those who claim that human resources are the number-one priority. Many things can be learned—the language, operational approach, military procedures—but all of it must have a foundation, and that is the way of thinking. The soldier must not doubt the necessity of defending the country. He must know that democracy, human rights, and political freedom are things that are meaningful in themselves and are necessary to protect. In this respect, we must change the way of thinking. Only then comes the icing on the cake—the operational procedures, knowledge of languages, form of organization, etc. The change will apparently take some time.

We Cannot Start With the End

[RESPEKT] Even today, some deputies doubt the fairness of the T-72 tender. Nevertheless, Minister Holan signed the contract that resulted from the competition. At any rate, the new concept of the Army will apparently turn everything upside down, and it may emerge that the 350, 250, or 200 tanks considered for modernization will not be needed.

[Necas] From the point of view of national strategy and concept, which determine the objectives, we arrive at the force structure, and the structure then indicates how many arms systems we need and what type. On the basis of this, the decision can be made on what is to be modernized and how. We cannot start from the end.

[RESPEKT] Nevertheless, the result of the tender is here, and contracts should be signed.

[Necas] In addition to being a politician and a deputy, I am a government employee, and, in my position, I simply must respect the decision of my superior. I have carefully studied all of the documentation, including the report on the inspection of the Ministry for Economic Competition, and personally verified the information in Prague and Novy Jicin. I arrived at a certain conclusion, which I conveyed openly to the Defense Ministry management. I have also commented orally at the ministerial council session at which our sector was assigned new tasks.

[RESPEKT] Can you tell us more?

[Necas] No. Actually, there is one thing I can say: I suggested to the minister that the entire council of the Defense Ministry management should meet to discuss the results of the tender to deduce the specific consequences of the inspection report, including personnel changes. So far, the council has not been called.

[RESPEKT] Is it possible that, in the future, the government will decide not to go ahead with the modernization based on the results of the tender?

[Necas] I do not want to speculate, but it cannot be ruled out.

[RESPEKT] The situation with the aircraft is not clear either. MiG-21 or F-16?

[Necas] In a way, I believe it is an artificial problem. Simply, today we need neither the modernized MiG-21 nor the F-16. The primary issue is the combat capability and good training of our Air Force. Do we have sufficiently well-trained pilots, capable of fulfilling their tasks, and do we have a sufficient number of combat-ready aircraft? That is the correct question!

[RESPEKT] You will have 28 billion korunas at you disposal, and you are to decide what to buy. In what will you invest?

[Necas] I would focus unequivocally on the work with people and on holding onto young professionals and attracting more of them. They are the ones who have problems. It is not just the salaries. The Army will never be able to pay well enough to compete with the commercial sector on the labor market, however, We can provide a certain social care and education, and that even for the so-called second career. One of the reasons the Army must draft a new concept is the acquisition plan. When you take a look at 15 key projects with the highest priority in the present plan, the individual person is left out completely. Where do you see that the individual is the highest priority? Nowhere!

[RESPEKT] But the Defense Ministry is the so-called power sector.

[Necas] I would like to reach the point at which the ministry becomes a standard body of state administration. I do not like hearing about the power ministries; it smells of Russia.

[RESPEKT] Speaking of Russia, Russia recently announced officially that it will not be able to observe the arms-reduction convention. Can that somehow specifically threaten us? Will that influence our military doctrine or strategy?

[Necas] The violation of an agreement primarily says something about Russia. He who fails to observe contracts is not a serious partner. Of course, it is possible that Russia will violate the deadline but still observe the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

content of the treaty. The conceivable violation of the treaty primarily involves the area of the northern and southern wings and the troops in southern Russia toward the Caucasus. This does not represent a direct threat to the Republic or Central Europe. The fact, however, that there is a state that does not fulfill its obligations in the sphere of security agreements is a risk factor.

[RESPEKT] Can you generalize it? Would Russia downgrade its trustworthiness as an international partner?

[Necas] If it really violates the convention, then yes.

[RESPEKT] Do your subordinates agree?

[Necas] In principle, yes. I have not heard anything else from them.

[RESPEKT] Nonetheless, the Russians are acting more or less rationally. If you were in Minister Grachev's shoes, how would you act if you were facing the dilemma of either observing at any cost the contractual obligations to the West, which does not exactly play marching music for Russia, or protecting Russia's security interests?

[Necas] That is a speculative question. I am not and never will be in General Grachev's shoes. Moreover, I am not a Russian, but a Czech politician. I insist that treaties be observed. If they are disadvantageous, let us go to the table and discuss how to change them.

I Am Useless as a Marksman

[RESPEKT] The Constitutional Defense Law has not been passed in six years.

[Necas] It is not the fault of the Defense Ministry. [passage omitted] Nevertheless, I do not believe it is a catastrophe.

[RESPEKT] So, the Constitutional Defense Law is not necessary for drafting other military bills?

[Necas] If someone says we do not have the Constitutional Defense Law and therefore cannot draft other legislation, he is only looking for excuses while, in fact, he does not want to work.

[RESPEKT] The Defense Ministry is controlled by a single party—the people's party. Will the Civic Democratic Party, in the instance of the election victory, demand the post of defense minister?

[Necas] This is speculation. You must ask the Civic Democratic Party top brass, not me. It is true that the ministry was assigned to the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party on the basis of the coalition agreement, just as the post of first deputy was earmarked for a Civic Democratic Party member. Other posts are not subject to any agreement, and it is up to the minister how he will fill them. That is the main fact, and I do not intend to comment on it or question it. The coalition agreement has been observed clearly. On the other hand, there is the second fact, which I again do not intend to comment on or question—that, of the eight people at the head of the sector (minister, three deputy ministers, and four section director generals), half are members of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. Half of the top management belongs to the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Meciar, Bulgaria's Videnov on Presidency, NATO

AU1212172595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Dec 95 pp 1, 13

[Report by special correspondent Ivan Drabek: "We Helped To Open the Door for Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sofia—[Passage omitted] [During their talks in Sofia on 8 December] Prime Ministers Vladimir Meciar and Zhan Videnov initiated an early meeting of the ministers of finance and privatization and of national bank governors to prepare conditions for a free market for goods, capital, and services. One of their tasks will also be to assess the Slovak prime minister's proposal to make use of the convertible Slovak koruna in mutual financial transactions.

Zhan Videnov voiced appreciation for [Slovakia's] readiness to cooperate even in a delicate area such as privatization. Incidentally, Stefan Rosina, general director of the Matador Puchov company [tire manufacturer], one of the more than 20 businessmen accompanying the government delegation to Slovenia and Bulgaria, yesterday visited the DINAMIK company in Sofia, in which the Slovak company wants to obtain a 51-percent share. A letter of intent has already been signed, and the project, which has the support of both prime ministers, should be assessed by the Bulgarian National Property Fund in the coming months. [passage omitted]

After yesterday's talks, Vladimir Meciar voiced satisfaction with Bulgaria's support for his proposal for a meeting of the heads of government of EU associate countries before next year's EU intergovernmental conference. In conjunction with this initiative, he rejected, however, the ambition to be the leader in the association process.

Asked by PRAVDA whether the two prime ministers also touched upon the not exactly best international image of their governments, which are being reproached for their conflicts with the presidents of their countries and for the ambivalence of their orientation toward European and euro-atlantic integrative groupings, Zhan Videnov stressed that he and Vladimir Meciar had agreed that the strength of executive power in countries such as Bulgaria and Slovakia largely depends on the success of the governments' work. At the same time, they spoke out against strong presidential power. According to Videnov, there is no need to question the two countries' will to become integrated in European structures because they are EU associate members and because precisely the present Governments of Bulgaria and Slovakia had filed applications for full-fledged EU membership. "If problems with the international image of the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria appear from time to time, it is certain that these problems are almost never the product of the reality, but an expression of the interests of circles far away from our countries," he added. Vladimir Meciar said that various forms of tension between the supreme bodies exist in all states. He admitted, however, that, at present, many negative signals about us are being emitted by ourselves. According to Meciar, this is "a consequence of domestic political struggles, when those who are losing support at home are looking for help abroad."

With regard to the Slovak Republic's attitude toward NATO, Vladimir Meciar recalled the policy statement of his government, in which NATO entry is defined as a goal. He stressed, however, that the Slovak Republic advocates such a system of Pan-European security as would rule out the continent's division into spheres of influence. He observed that the Slovak Republic does not need anyone's approval to seek NATO membership. According to Videnov, Bulgaria has not yet decided whether NATO membership or neutrality will be more advantageous for the country. He personally does not support the initiative to call a referendum on Bulgaria's neutrality. The Slovak Republic delegation returned to Bratislava yesterday.

Meciar Ambition To Lead EU Associate Members

AU1312130295 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 11 Dec 95 p 4

[Article by Ivan Drabek: "In the Quest for Fingers for a Fist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Meciar's visit to Slovenia and Bulgaria last week confirmed how seriously the prime minister takes the Slovak Republic's chairmanship of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) next year. Whereas in Ljubljana he heard words of gratitude for the support Bratislava extended to Slovenia's admission into the free trade zone of the former Visegrad Four, in Sofia, through the freshly signed bilateral free trade agreement, Slovakia actually opened for Bulgaria the gate to the five-member Central European common market. The dynamic and sharply accelerating development of the still-modest economic cooperation with Slovenia since the conclusion of the free trade agreement offers the hope that, under the new conditions, a similar breakthrough will be achieved also in relations with Bulgaria.

The Slovak prime minister's ambitions to play a more important role in the process of the postcommunist countries' integration into Europe are not confined to the soil of CEFTA, however. While in the Balkans, Vladimir Meciar was gathering support for his initiative for closer coordination of countries seeking admission

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

into the EU in shaping their attitude toward Brussels. "Now we are like a finger. But if we coordinate our work, we will be like a fist, and even those who do not want to hear us will have to listen to us," he told the chairman of the Slovene parliament, adding that he wants nothing but that Slovaks and Slovenes should not find themselves "in Yalta or Potsdam" but should change from the passive objects of foreign policy into its active subjects.

In Bulgaria, Vladimir Meciar had no problems gaining support for his proposal for a meeting of the heads of government of EU associate countries before next year's EU intergovernmental conference, which is to become a major landmark in its history. Slovene representatives could not be similarly accommodating toward this proposal because their associate agreement with the EU is still blocked by Italy because of unsettled bilateral disputes. Rome demands that Ljubljana adapt its legislation to EU norms and abolish legal provisions barring foreign nationals from owning real estate in Slovenia. In view of the restitution claims of thousands of expropriated Italians who left Tiso's Yugoslavia after World War II, this is a very delicate problem. At the same time, the search for a compromise solution to it is complicated by the approaching parliamentary elections in both countries. Given the fact that, on the eve of the Italian six-months EU chairmanship, even countries more influential than Slovakia prefer not to get involved in this bilateral dispute, observers in Ljubljana were surprised by Vladimir Meciar's readiness to plead for Slovenia internationally in this matter.

The Slovak prime minister probably could not offer a more convincing proof of his determination to pay even a very high price for each finger for the common fist with which to pound on the EU's door. He made this gesture despite the fact that his hosts in Ljubljana reacted with diplomatic silence to his objections to the form of the EU's communication with Slovakia ("no one had consulted with us on the demarches," "10 or 15 deputies are enough to pass a European Parliament resolution, with which we cannot agree").

In this regard, Vladimir Meciar found a more accommodating partner in Bulgaria, which, too, is having problems with its international image, owing to the conflict between the government and the president, the course of privatization, and the overly painstaking consideration of Moscow's strategic interests with regard to NATO's eastward expansion. It is absolutely clear to Prime Minister Zhan Videnov that, "if problems with the international image of Slovakia and Bulgaria appear from time to time, these problems have nothing in common with the reality but are an expression of interests far away from our countries' borders."

It is to be hoped that words like these, which sound so pleasant after the series of demarches, will not make Slovak diplomacy try to become the spokesman for all the wronged, misunderstood, and not fully appreciated countries in our part of Europe. In the Balkans alone, there are more such countries than are needed for one fist....

Meciar Interviewed on Achievements, Tasks

LD1212223395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by station chief editor Michal Michalcik on the occasion of the first anniversary of the election of Meciar's third government—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Michalcik] [Passage omitted] Prime Minister, there is no doubt that in the past year you achieved good and promising results in the economy. However, I cannot help feeling that your Cabinet has failed to translate these economic successes into much needed political capital, including relations with other countries, something that would be good for Slovakia. Why?

[Meciar] [Passage omitted] When we do something well, it is always overshadowed by something silly. We do not focus on the decisive things that determine the very lives of the people. We always manage to drown such things in trivia or silly concerns that are fed to the public everywhere as political sensations. For example, somebody lets out the rumor that Meciar was on the border the night they kidnapped Michal Kovac. This is crazy. Nonetheless, it overshadows our propaganda efforts and everybody abroad is then saying: What on earth is the prime minister doing on the border at night? And in this way we ourselves always manufacture something bad. [passage indistinct]

[Michalcik] During your last visit to Germany, at the time of the demarches, the German president—and I hope I am quoting him correctly—advised you to go on a counteroffensive. Prime Minister, was not the time after the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty in March 1995 the right time to do that? After all, at that time we were getting praise from all over Europe and the world.

[Meciar] We have not halted the offensive. But the point is that not everything is always successful instantly, and results are not always immediately evident. After the Paris meeting, we had to tackle the complex question of what to do next. In the first place, it was necessary to define our plan of action and coordinate our views on the possible interpretation of the agreement by

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the opposition—that is why we first dealt with the general agreement. That goal has been achieved and, to date, thanks to our initiative, the agreement has been recognized by four European states, including Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. We have an interest in the success of such agreements, but also in stability and good relations at home.

The next thing was to prepare the right prerequisites at home. It was as if most political subjects had been paralyzed by the speedy progress achieved in concluding the agreement that constitutes a key document in stabilizing relations in Central Europe. This is not a backward looking document but one that looks ahead. [passage indistinct]

[Michalcik] Certain postcommunist countries, unfortunately including our neighbors, have started a kind of race regarding integration into West European structures. Prime Minister, what do you think about this kind of race? In your view, what kind of role should Slovakia play in the sensitive central European region?

[Meciar] When we look at the postcommunist countries through the prism of the past, we see that in the Central European region only two prime ministers have emerged from the popular movement—Prime Minister Klaus and I. The rest used to hold various high offices inside the former communist parties. I do not hold it against them—everyone has the right to reform himself and many of them have completed such reformation and now are outstanding people. But when we want to move forward, and when we consider the positive and the negative aspects of this development, then it is pointless [words indistinct] if somebody always wants to be the first one. We have stated our intentions, taken the appropriate legal steps, submitted the correct application forms, and have done everything else required by the decision process. This process is already under way, it has its logic, and it will will inevitably go ahead. The first decisions in this process will be announced in 1998, followed by a preparatory stage and then by the decision of the European federation.

This process has its logic, its mechanism, and its chronology. It is an irreversible process which can be slowed down but never stopped. So the question is, which countries will succeed in mobilizing their internal resources in order to play a dignified role in the new circumstances. Our answer to those who keep shouting: Look, we have got there, take note of us, is: Let's get on with the preparations, because we have a tough competition struggle on our hands and our economy, our market, and our labor force must be able to withstand foreign competition, in other words all this must be first class!

This then is the purpose of all our effort, this is what we strive for. Being overzealous and drawing attention to oneself may be even used as a way out of internal problems. Just look at some countries with their struggling economies, and you will see that they believe that early admittance to the European Union will improve their internal situation thanks to the money they hope to receive from the union's funds. It looks almost as if the European Union was giving these people an advance for their integration. This is a mistake. It is a politically erroneous calculation which helps only to get from one election to the next. But in the long run it is useless. [passage indistinct]

As regards resolutions for the future, I think we still have to discover ourselves. We yet have to explore the extent of our potential as a state, as a society and as individuals. In our internal organization there should be more cohesion, harmony, and respect for the rules. But all this is being created and nurtured for the future. Some may say that the process has too many conflicts or that it takes too long. But it does take place all the same—naturally, without violence, without violating the laws or humiliating people. Let us be grateful for all this, too. [passage omitted]

Ministry Clarifies Sestak Statement on Treaty

AU1212142695 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Dec 95 p 2

[Report by TASR, PA: "Foreign Ministry Spokesman: Press Tore the Quote on Hitler and Treaty Out of Context"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Juraj Matejovsky, director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department, yesterday issued a statement on the reactions of the dailies SME, NARODNA OBRODA, and PRAVDA to the characterization by Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the ratification of the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic. The statement, which also reacts to Democratic Party Chairman Jan Langos's appeal of 1 December, says, among other things: "These reactions grossly misinterpret the debate on the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic that took place in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Environmental Committee on 1 December 1995." In this debate, Jozef Sestak defended the treaty all of the time as the product of a compromise and supported its inclusion in the agenda of the December session of parliament and its ratification. During negotiations with the Hungarian side, he enforced the inclusion of the national and state interests of the Slovak Republic in the treaty, taking into consideration

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the fact that only a compromise can lead to its signing. As regards the quote "...the treaty is not an ideal one with regard to Slovakia's state interests (...), ideal treaties used to be concluded by Hitler when he had 150 divisions on the border and had dictated what he wanted to the other side," it is torn out of the context of the entire debate. The statement was made in reaction to criticism by opposition Deputy Moravcik, who demanded that the government explain why it is submitting for ratification a treaty that is not ideal from the viewpoint of the Slovak Republic's state interests. By using the above historical example, the state secretary wanted to explain the difference between compromise and diktat. He wanted to stress precisely that diktat is unacceptable to the civilized world. In the NRSR Environmental Committee, but also in other parliamentary committees, he clearly defended the treaty as a compromise, which can be documented by the minutes from NRSR committee meetings. The treaty agreed upon and signed by the Slovak side bears out that the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic are building constructive international relations on the basis of compromise, and not diktat.

'High-Ranking' Source Reports 'Purges' in SIS

AU1312081395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 11 Dec 95 p 1

[Report by "pt": "Bratislava Underworld Shows Interest in Sacked SIS Employees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Mass dismissals of intelligence officers from the Slovak secret service started when Ivan Lexa became Slovak Information Service [SIS] director and, in particular, after the abduction of the president's son to Austria, said a high-ranking source, who asked not to be named, in an interview for SME. According to his words, these purges are conducted without any reasons being given, in breach of valid laws and SIS internal rules. The employees being laid off must leave the secret service without receiving an explanation, or on the basis of fabricated transgressions. As the aforesaid source said, the liquidated [likvidovani] SIS employees are not paid the severance pay set by law, and their families are facing existential problems because they cannot find jobs in the state administration. The wave of dismissals hit most notably employees with several years of experience in intelligence. The Bratislava underworld obtained information about their professional qualities and current existential problems. Its highest "bosses" have shown interest in the services of one-time SIS members and have offered them lucrative jobs as bodyguards.

Article Berates Soros's 'Open Societies'

AU1212182995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (DO TOHO supplement) in Slovak 7 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by Roman Hofbauer: "The Citizens of Slovakia Realized What It Was All About"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The babbling of George Soros and the idea of Pan-European cosmopolitanism espoused by him go hand in hand with [illegible] decades of diktat-enforced—and renounced—pro[illegible]an internationalism. After all, realization of worl[illegible]de synergy is not at bellicose variance with national identity, which applies—naturally—both ways. The condemnation by him of the awareness of national belonging among the 22 states of the "Soviet Empire" is merely intended to scare the other Western citizens and to mislead the public, but also to mislead the citizens of the aforementioned 22 states.

Let us try to analyze for which societies and ethnic communities of current Western civilization traits of pronounced nationalism are a characteristic feature.

Historically, the most secluded features of national togetherness are a characteristic of the Jewish community. Due to its cohesion, its tendency to be enclosed within itself, and its impenetrability by other influences, it has survived, is surviving, and will survive despite all of the adversities of time. At the same time, a great many of the external adversities may not have happened at all—and, therefore, it would not have been necessary to struggle against them—if this community had been communicative and not secluded and enclosed in a shunning manner.

Unquestionably, the United States has precedence in superpower nationalism. American nationalism ensues from the understandable, predatory, and ambitious pride of the multinational melting pot of the group of settlers who created a power of the first magnitude out of the wilderness. America first [English expression used], America first!—a slogan of absolute nationalist superiority over everyone else, because only one can be first and all the rest can only be something other than first. And America, as the first, makes its primacy very obviously clear and brings it to the attention of all of those that are not first.

Mr. George Soros, who cautions against the nationalism of the states of the "Soviet Empire," is a Hungarian emigre from the Jewish community and has U.S. citizenship. Is there, perhaps, a hint of the assumption that he would not belong to the aforementioned three most prominent nationalist communities and ethnic groups and, if yes, why does he relate the bogeyman of nationalism only to a select group of nation states? If the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

features of nationalism had bypassed him, this would have been as remarkable as the biblical conversion of Saul into Paul. But, the mere fact that the Bible mentions this conversion means that it is—undoubtedly—a unique phenomenon of biblical exceptionality and rarity. Similarly, it is curious that Mr. Soros is brandishing the bogeyman of nationalism against 22 states the majority of which are Slavic, and which historically have always had to suffer the consequences of the nationalism of others.

From his reasoning on the nationalism of the states of the "Soviet Empire," G. Soros leaps toward claims about the emerging political structures—a potpourri of nationalist ideologies with prominent commercial interests, which is, according to him, "the traditional recipe for fascism and ethnic nationalism." In conjunction with this assertion, it is impossible to overlook or trivialize the fact that he cites as an example three states and three of their leading representatives: Milosevic in Yugoslavia, Tudjman in Croatia, and Meciar in Slovakia. G. Soros continues smoothly in his (his?) reasoning: "Various forces may seize control of a state, but the outcome is by no means decided. One thing is, however, certain: Whoever wants to win the support of the people in these countries has to use nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric, because the people are disappointed with and angry at the West." It is pointless to polemicize, discuss, or explain anything in any dialogue with anyone from the Soros camp about Slovaks, Slovakia, and Meciar.

The statements and claims of G. Soros have the characteristics of the infallibility of axioms that are not subject to the furnishing of proof and, thus, their author also precludes a dialogue that would make it possible to present a different situation. The fact that his axioms are complete nonsense does not at all interest the Soros camp and will not interest it.

It does not even make much sense to say that the states of Central and Eastern Europe were governed for decades by a large and powerful tutor, that this camp functioned as a massive centrifuge for draining away the generation and output of the states' national wealth, and as each tutor has the parameters of a centrifuge, these states of the "Soviet Empire" are not interested in exchanging one economic-political vassalage for another, albeit one coming from the opposite direction.

The claim about anger at the West is a complete mistake, although only for the reason that no one expected exceptional help from the West; after all, never in its history has the West offered substantial and unselfish help to anyone poor and battling with problems! Help does not figure in finance and commerce. If it were to help, then only into the snare of indebtedness and—thus—of dependence and subordination.

Using fascism as a scare tactic is very cheap and Western states, at the moment, are merely salving their own complexes of cowardice for the period when they did very little or nothing at all against Hungarian, Italian, and German fascism. Using fascism as a scare tactic in relation to the 22 states of the "Soviet Empire" is, at the same time, quite absurd and historically nonsensical. After all, with the exception of Hungary, not one of the aforementioned states was a birthplace per se or home country of fascism.

On the contrary, this perverse ideology was—again with the exception of Hungary—imported by them and violently enforced; it was imported from the states, and under the eye of other states, that Mr. G. Soros is now hailing as a safety barrier against fascism. And again: Is it just a curious coincidence that G. Soros says this in connection with 22 states of which the majority are Slavic?!

In conjunction with the above, it is interesting to return to the beginning of George Soros's speech where he says that, during the past five years, he has donated half of his income and a substantial amount of his time to the network of foundations that now operate in the 22 countries... It is necessary to pause here. The huge financial sums that pay for, in particular, the Quantum Fund and the other associated elements of Soros's financial empire are not used in the sphere of tangible or intangible production. The focal point of his income and wealth involves financial, stock market, and currency speculation in which no values are created.

Someone outside of this empire always has to pay for and sustain the increase in the wealth of this empire. Mankind will not grow rich from wealth created in this way, because no value is created; financial resources are merely amassed and transferred by financial speculations. Well, half of the income generated in this manner is donated to the network of foundations to benefit the socio-economic experiment of a cosmopolitan open society in the states of the "Soviet Empire," that is, toward influencing their direction and orientation, toward the construction and destruction of their structures and spectra, and toward orienting and disorienting the people in these states and opinions outside them. A truly singular, unique, and, to put it mildly, untraditional method and objectives with which it was necessary to express satisfaction at the Crans Montana Economic Forum in Davos and for which it was necessary to receive the appropriate appreciation.

It is essential to study carefully Mr. George Soros's speech in Davos, because it really is interesting. Every-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

one may be engrossed by different things in it and the possible interpretation of it may also be different.

Three sections from the end of his speech caught my attention: "... no concept of common interest. Without it, no society can stay together as a whole. It can be argued—and, sometimes a great deal of energy is devoted to this argument, especially in the United States—that the unbridled pursuit of one's own interests is in fact in the general interest. I am convinced that this argument is erroneous. It promotes competition to the detriment of cooperation. Competition is very important. It is a source of innovation and improvement and—what is even more important—it provides the possibility of choice. But, competition or rivalry are not sustainable without a certain level of cooperation. If they are not bound by the rules and standards of their conduct, they become destructive. This is clearly visible on the international scene where there are no adequate rules and standards, but it is equally true in internal state issues. Indeed, the most important lesson from the history of the past five years is that pursuing one's own interests is not enough..."

"...the main shortcoming of Western democracies...is (their) moral decline..."

"...Prior to the breakup of the Soviet empire, we lived in a stable world order. This order has collapsed and no new one has taken its place. If there is no order, we stand face to face with rising chaos.... How will we protect peace and order in the world if we do not acknowledge the need for world order? The communist threat held the free world together in unity. Now, when the evil empire has disappeared, we need a positive idea that would unite us..."

These are, without doubt, very interesting ideas.

It is only necessary to express regret that Mr. George Soros—and the society represented by him, whose "cutting edge" is Mr. Soros himself—does not devote his colossal energy, a substantial amount of his time, and half of his income to rectifying the shortcomings of the Western states and societies that for the 22 states of the "former Soviet Empire" are models of an open society, while in fact they are not open societies and do not even want to be. The unfortunate 22 states do not know what should and should not be their model; after all, even Mr. Soros expresses more than enough reservations and criticisms about Western states.

It is a pity that, at the Crans Montana Economic Forum in July 1995, the view and observation was not expressed that the epoch of universal models is behind us, it has been overcome, because there is no universal model just as there is no universal cosmopolitan food, dress, language, color of skin, or religion. And, if someone were to want to create a universal model and apply it universally, it would only be possible at the cost of another ideological struggle—until not a stone would be left standing—for the untried socioeconomic experiment of a cosmopolitan open society toward which even the West is not well disposed.

How can our most current events—the finger raised against Slovakia, the demarches addressed to the Slovak Government, the mass-media bombardment of Slovakia by the world's opinion-forming media in which the "cosmopolitan" U.S. commentators play a leading role—be further augmented?

Such a tidal wave always surges when the pronationally oriented parties win the elections in Slovakia, when the election winner, Vladimir Meciar, forms the government, and when the privatization of national property by means of coupon shares does not disappear via unidentifiable investment funds into even more unidentifiable hands that would—without risk and for nothing—obtain Slovakia's capacities and market, but when privatization is carried out by Slovak investors and businessmen. The tidal mass-media anti-Slovak wave always subsides miraculously when the legitimate pronational government is toppled and when a political cartel willing to sell of national property for nothing to anyone is patched together.

That our current president along with the opposition's political entities, who lost the elections, are borne on top of this tidal wave; that, in the interest of endeavoring to overthrow the government again, the president and the opposition are using almost arbitrary methods to destroy our political scene; and that they are criminalizing political acts and politicizing criminal acts and licentiously vilifying Slovakia and the parliamentary political scene to the drums and trumpets of the "independent" media—which is independent only in Slovakia, but dependent on publishers—at home and abroad are logical phenomena. After all, they are to work on behalf of someone and they also have something to work for since G. Soros admits that "... during the past five years, I have donated half of my income and a substantial amount of my time to the network of foundations that are now operating in the 22 countries of the former Soviet empire... because I realized that this was something of exceptional importance."

The majority of Slovakia's citizens have also realized this; after all, it is enough just to look at what is happening at the moment and at what the cosmopolitan open societies do not hesitate to undertake against Slovakia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Gen Vestenicky Hopes To Sell Tanks to Malaysia

AU1312113395 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 9 Dec 95 p 3

[Report by "pv": "Quality of the Tank Is Not Matched by Its Presentation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Major General Emil Vestenicky, chief of staff of the Slovak Army General Staff's Ground Forces, who participated, as of 4 December, in the Third International Naval, Air, and Space Exhibition on Langkawi Island at the invitation of the Malaysian minister of defense, returned from Malaysia on 8 December at night. The Malaysian Army intends to purchase 300 tanks by the year 2000. One of the three tentatively chosen suppliers is Slovakia, with its modernized version of the T-72 tank (the other shortlisted candidates are Poland, with its T-72 MiZ, and the British firm Vickers, with its Mark III tank). After his return from the Malaysian arms exhibition, we asked Gen. Vestenicky about our suppliers' chances of winning this order. The general told us that he is a soldier and is not going to comment on the commercial aspect of the possible contract. However, as a specialist for tank technology, he told us:

[Vestenicky] I had the opportunity to see the rival projects. I was inside the Polish T-72 MiZ. I also know the other modernized versions of the T-72, prepared still by the Soviets and, subsequently, by Ukrainians and Czechs. I can say that our model is far ahead of all of the other versions of the modernized T-72—in terms of the quality of the fire-control systems, the night-vision equipment, resistance to air strikes, warning systems against targeting by laser devices, and the armor plating itself. It is a great pity that the quality of our tank is not matched by its presentation in the world.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 7 December on page 1 carries a 200-word report by "kw" entitled "Tank Deal With Malaysia Is in the Works." The report quotes Engineer Kubacka, deputy director of ZTS [Heavy Engineering Works] Martin, as saying that the Slovak manufacturer would be able to "realize" the tank deal with Malaysia, which "is in the works." The report adds: "When we asked Engineer Kubacka about details of the deal, we learned that strictly confidential matters are involved at this stage and that publicity could damage the ZTS's interests. The Slovak manufacturer of T-72 tanks is ready to inform the public only when the deal is more or less certain for Slovakia."]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

New Air Defense Chief on Tasks, Reorganization

AU1212172095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Dec 95 p 6

[Interview with Brigadier General Attila Kositzky by Beno Jozsa; place and date not given: "Pilots Will Not Be Dismissed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The defense minister appointed Brigadier General Attila Kositzky as head of the Hungarian Army's Air Defense Command on 1 December 1995, and also as commander of the 2nd Airborne and Air Defense Unit beginning with 15 December. Kositzky is 52 years old and, so far, he has flown 3,200 hours in 6,200 takeoffs.

[Jozsa] Our pilots can fly an average of 45-50 hours a year, and many people consider this to be a dangerously low number of hours.

[Kositzky] That is true. It is alarmingly low. And the main problem is that this situation has been prevailing for the sixth year.

[Jozsa] Could this threaten the life of less experienced pilots?

[Kositzky] I would not put it this way, but it is a fact that we had to reduce certain tasks, and the pilots "are yearning" for the much bigger number of flight hours in the past. They are aware of Hungary's financial situation, but they nevertheless tell every forum how important it is to obtain more expertise and more thorough training through extended hours of flight.

[Jozsa] You have just become national air defense commander, but you will be commander of an army corps beginning with 15 December. Is this only a change in the name, or does this already represent the reorganization of the Hungarian air defense?

[Kositzky] The army leadership wants to develop a more operative and mobile command system and, on first reading, in our case, this gives the impression that the air defense leadership becomes lower in grade; however, there will be command positions in Veszprem with much bigger responsibility and work. We will also incorporate three new units: the combat helicopter unit of Szentkiralyszabadja, and the airborne and helicopter transport units of Tokol and Szolnok. These units have been under the command of the land forces headquarters so far.

[Jozsa] Every army aircraft is now under your command. Would this also be so in case of war?

[Kositzky] Under combat circumstances, the equipment is used by those who mostly need it; in other words, in case of war, we would probably return some aircraft to the land forces command.

[Jozsa] To what extent does the armed forces reform affect our air defense?

[Kositzky] Although our personnel increased with the aforementioned three units attached to us, reduction in personnel essentially prevails in our place too, a reduction of about 25 percent. We are adjusting to the personnel categories accepted within NATO, but I find it important to stress that there will be no pilots among people slated for demobilization.

Minister Discusses Mass Impoverishment

AU1212173995 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 9 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Welfare Minister Gyorgy Szabo by Anita Elo; place and date not given; "We Are Compelled to a Policy of Poverty—Gyorgy Szabo on the Ministry's Delays, Ending Support, and Why People Have To Freeze in the Streets"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A few weeks ago, news had it that he was considering resigning, his chair insecure. Then Prime Minister Gyula Horn supported him by personally appearing at the general meeting of the health workers' trade union, and this way the strike could be avoided. For Welfare Minister Gyorgy Szabo, the next major challenge is whether mass impoverishment in the population can be handled by welfare policy means while the amount used for this goal will be one-fifth less next year.

[Elo] We heard on the news that people were freezing in the first cold wave, the television showed a teacher who does cleaning after work to be able to survive, families are dismantling their houses because the National Savings Bank would have auctioned them because they cannot pay the loan installments. Do you also sense a worsening in the country's welfare situation in recent months?

[Szabo] I am mainly worried because this is also affecting those social strata that did not believe that they would also fall into difficult circumstances. According to calculations of the statistical office, the value of real wages is 10 percent less this year. This dramatic worsening of the situation has a shocking effect on society. It is almost impossible to explain that this did not happen overnight, rather, it is the result of a many decades-long process. One has to face the fact that this is a terribly poor country that is spending beyond its means. [passage omitted]

[Elo] Can one defend any of the ideas which try to resolve the contradiction that while whole social strata

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

are getting poor, the amount that can be spent on welfare policy is decreasing?

[Szabo] This is not the biggest problem, although we have also had to suffer certain restrictions. I can safely say that the cutback is not as big as in other areas. The real value of reduction is 20 percent between 1995 and 1996.

[Elo] And you do not see this as the biggest problem?

[Szabo] It is more serious that some of the support does not get to the target groups who need it most. The vast majority of society has a lower living standard now than before. In this situation, welfare policy can do one thing: It can support the poorest—even if we are accused of conducting a policy of poverty. It is not at all easy to find the method to target those people who are unable to pay for their everyday costs and who are threatened with eviction.

[Elo] My impression is that you are not coping with this task.

[Szabo] Workable proposals have not yet been made. Many ideas have been formed and we do not have much time to implement them. It is not true that we are completely in the dark and that nothing is happening. However, if I want to apply the social minimum subsistence level calculations then 70 to 80 percent of people will be entitled to welfare benefits. We must place the most endangered target groups, namely, families with children, the elderly, the handicapped, and the unemployed in the forefront of welfare policy. [passage omitted]

[Elo] The income supplement given to long-term unemployed will be terminated the end of September [year not given]. Can this be reconciled with the fact that you wish to give special support to the unemployed? You come from Miskolc, a crisis region; how will you be able to report to your electors?

[Szabo] This question is justified. The law also states that a person who can prove 90 days of employment can again receive unemployment benefits. Many people have become used to the fact that the income supplement is due to them anyway, even if they do not do anything to find a job and, of course, are working illegally at the same time.

[Elo] The illegal workers will then legalize their activity for 90 days. But what will happen to the others?

[Szabo] This is the real challenge because some unemployed people's abilities do not represent any value in the labor market. For these people it is almost impossible to show proof of these 90 days. We must find resources for them in the labor market fund through organizing communal projects. Tasks waiting to be performed exist in all locations. [passage omitted]

[Elo] The past weeks were characterized by resignations. You also stated previously that you did not feel your position secure. Do you still hold this view after the Hungarian Socialist Party's congress?

[Szabo] I was very surprised when the interview published in NEPSZAVA was interpreted as an intention to resign. All I said was that it was possible that the team that had supported me up to now might withdraw its trust from me.

[Elo] Did Horn express his dissatisfaction, or on what did you base this view?

[Szabo] He did not. I only mentioned it as a theoretical possibility for which a politician has to be prepared. It is also possible that they will try to force me into an unacceptable compromise. I have decided that if I cannot reach my minimum goals, I will resign. [passage omitted]

FKGP Continues To Lead Party Popularity List

AU1212174295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 11 Dec 95 p 4

[Unattributed report on opinion poll results of political parties' popularity carried out by the Szonda Ipsos Opinion Poll Research Institute on 10-22 November: "The FKGP Is Again the Most Popular Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is the second time that the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] tops the popularity list of political parties; this time, its advantage over the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] is 4 percent, as opposed to 2 percent in August 1995. All this transpires from the results of the Szonda Ipsos opinion poll in November 1995. The survey took place after the FKGP national meeting and prior to the MSZP congress.

Compared to the previous survey carried out at the end of October and the beginning of November 1995, only support for the FKGP increased, namely, by 3 percent. Support for the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] has not changed, while support for the other parliamentary parties dropped by an average of 1 or 2 percent, but such little changes are not significant statistically. Support for parties outside parliament dropped to such an extent in December 1995 that these parties together do not even reach the level of support of the least supported parliamentary party.

As a result of recent changes, special relations developed within the opposition. The FKGP alone has as many supporters as the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF], the KDNP, and the Federation of Young

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Democrats [FIDESZ] together. The FKGP not only increased its supporters threefold since last year's elections, but the number of people who had the FKGP as a second preference and the group of people that opposed them also changed somewhat. The FKGP reserves, or the group of people who regard the FKGP as their second preference, was 3 percent last summer, 5 percent by the end of 1994, and reached 6 percent this year. The composition of this group is rather heterogeneous, although there are fewer university graduates and leaders among them. Some 14 percent of the people expressed strong antipathy toward the FKGP 16 months ago; after a drop of 2-3 percent, this number again increased and reached the current 15 percent. This antipathy is to be found mainly among high school and university graduates and people working in intellectual jobs. Public opinion is dealing with the FKGP more than ever before, and the party has never before divided the Hungarian society to this extent; the average proportion of FKGP supporters and opponents is the highest today.

The FKGP has considerable power of retaining voters: three-quarters of the people who voted in favor of this party in the 1994 elections would again vote the same. In addition to keeping the faithful voters, the increase in support for the FKGP derives from the fact that this party obtained the largest number of new sympathizers. People who did not vote in 1994 and former MSZP supporters make up a considerable proportion of the present FKGP supporters: 27 percent and 16 percent respectively.

The fact that most people regard the FKGP as the winner of a possible election now indirectly strengthens the position of this party. Compared with 1-4 percent last year, today 35 percent of the people think that the FKGP would win the elections. However, the chances of the FKGP are reduced by the fact that its supporters do not show great readiness for participating in the elections. Only FIDESZ supporters appear to be more passive than that.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Izetbegovic Says 'No Negotiations' in Paris

AU1212203195 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today left Sarajevo for Paris. They are going to sign the Dayton accord in the French capital city on Thursday, 14 December. This accord should also be signed by the presidents of Croatia and Serbia.

Before departing for Paris, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave a statement to a number [word indistinct] journalists:

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] [words indistinct] accord [words indistinct] ready to sign, [word indistinct] turn into a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The signatures are going to be made on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina by myself and Mr. Zubak. This was exactly the decision made at the [words indistinct] that is under way and that decision was made a few minutes ago.

Therefore, there will be no negotiations; only those of us who are to sign are going there. There will not be a complete delegation going, as we are of the opinion that negotiations were concluded in Dayton.

Talks will be held, of course, but they will not refer to what has been settled by the Dayton accord, but perhaps to future steps regarding the normalization of relations in the region in general and the first steps will be made aimed toward that normalization. Of course, among these, we are thinking of the (?mutual) recognition of all the countries created by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, establishing diplomatic relations, and other measures and steps that can contribute to a gradual normalization of the situation in the region.

Of course, the balancing of forces will also be touched upon, all with a view to achieving the maximum effects of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of the Dayton accord.

What I want to point out is that there will be no revanchism, no revenge, but there must be justice. In other words, the only people who should fear this peace are those who [words indistinct] of Bosnia. There will be no revanchism, no revenge, but there must be justice. This is what I would like to say on this occasion. [end recording]

Calls Referendum 'Farce'

AU1212165995 Paris AFP in English 1641 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 12 (AFP)—Lawmakers in Bosnia's Moslem-Croat Federation parliament formally backed the Dayton peace accord Tuesday [12 December] as President Alija Izetbegovic prepared to leave the Bosnian capital for the official signing ceremony in Paris on Thursday.

The Federation is one of the two political "entities" that will go to make up a postwar Bosnia envisaged by the Dayton agreement initialled last month after 44 months of bruising war. Republika Srpska [Serb Republic], the rebel Serb state, is the other.

Western political analysts in Sarajevo said Tuesday's parliament session was an important test of support for the Dayton agreement which has been poorly received by some Croats. Those from the thin so-called Posavina corridor in the north of Bosnia are angry that it will remain in Serb hands under the accord.

In a free vote however, the vast majority of the delegates in the 160 seat assembly voted in favour of Dayton with just eight against and seven abstentions.

Bosnia's President Izetbegovic welcomed the vote and said he and Federation President Kresimir Zubak were leaving for Paris, "to sign the Dayton agreement, to turn it into the peace agreement for Bosnia."

Zubak offered his resignation during the negotiations in protest at the solution found for the Posavina corridor but he will sign the Dayton document, Izetbegovic confirmed.

Asked about the referendum being held in Bosnian Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo due to return to government control, Izetbegovic called it a "farce" and added: "No elections, no referendums can take place in the conditions of terror if they should be valid and relevant."

Serbs in these districts have expressed fear that the Moslem population they laid siege to for over three years would seek retribution.

"I want to stress that there will be no revenge ... but there must be justice. In other words, only those who committed crimes should fear this peace," Bosnia's president said.

Silajdzic Dismisses Pale Serbs' 'Referendum'

AU1212213795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Bosnia-Herzegovina Television cor-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

respondent Duska Jurisic in Sarajevo on 12 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jurisic] How would you comment on the latest events in the parts of Sarajevo and the [word indistinct] of the capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Serb aggressor. Today they held a referendum with the very suggestive question: Do you want to be in the power of the Bosniak-Croat Federation?

[Silajdzic] Who was this referendum intended for? It was for the people who are there. The question is what we are going to do about those who are not there. Therefore, the priority for this government (?and) the international community must be the people who have been evicted from their houses. [word indistinct] are not there and they are the first priority. Therefore, something that does not cover the complete population or at least a majority cannot be called referendum. The majority of the population are not there.

Therefore, this is not a referendum, but a large-scale manipulation. Unfortunately, the Serb terrorist leaders are still persisting with the same method that in fact brought us to where we are now. Therefore, I hope that this course of events will make the Serbs in the occupied territories finally elect people who will bring peace and not [word indistinct].

What has been happening is a repeat of what we experienced four and a half years ago. Again there are mass demonstrations, manipulation, and so forth.

I think that the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities represent a sufficient guarantee to people both on the occupied territories and regions around Sarajevo, not because we say so, but because [passage indistinct].

Serbs, just like everybody else, are living with us here in Sarajevo. Places of worship [words indistinct]. My government and I personally have striven to resume religious life in Sarajevo, [words indistinct] new government. Schools, as well. When [Bosanska] Krupa was liberated, I went there and saw a destroyed Catholic church and a destroyed mosque, but an Orthodox church had been left alone, although there was not a single Orthodox Serb in Bosanska Krupa at that time.

The same thing was in Kljuc, and I saw that with my own eyes, and other places. What does it mean? It means that what we say may or may not be true, but what we all see in the field we must believe. Therefore, one must have confidence in these authorities. It is not going to be easy. There will be problems and controversial issues, but what we have been left is to live in a single Bosnia. We have only one Bosnia, only one state. Therefore, we must get used to living in one state and to having a law above us all. The international community is obliged to monitor and control the conduct of the authorities toward all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Constituent Assembly Deputies Debate Dayton Accord

AU1212162695

[FBIS Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1110 GMT on 12 December resumes the live relay from the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo.

Senada Cumurovic, correspondent from the assembly session, sums up the morning part of the debate, and recounts the initial portion of Federation President Kresimir Zubak's address, after which Zubak himself speaks to the delegates.

Zubak begins by recapitulating the events at the time of the signing of the Washington Agreement. He says that at the time, "our friends and sponsors, the United States, did not have the need to invest too much time and effort to convince us that a whole set of international legal documents would be part of the federal Constitution—from the UN Charter to the latest Helsinki and Paris Charters of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe." He goes on to say that in much the same way, they "did not have to spend too much time convincing the representatives of the Serb people at the Dayton negotiations, so that all these internationally endorsed documents have been incorporated into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, which is one of the things that we initialed there."

Zubak goes on to say that all these documents provide for all elementary human rights, the rights of humans and ethnic groups to life, dignity, religious, political, and other rights. However, Zubak points out, "while on the one hand these provisions are being put on a pedestal and continuously affirmed, on the other hand, this same agreement violates all these rights. How can we otherwise explain that the maps incorporate immense areas with a substantial Croatian or Bosniak-Muslim population—without the consent and against the will of these peoples—into the Serb Republic?" He says that the police and army of the Serb Republic have committed the worst crimes against these same people.

Zubak says that the Bosnia-Herzegovina tragedy began and continues because of the internal and external aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted "primarily by the political and military organizations from the ranks of the Serb people," who had a joint platform, that is, Greater Serbia. He adds that "in certain areas,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

this platform had almost unanimous support. That is not to say that I believe that this is the platform of the entire Serb nation or all political and other organizations of the Serb people." However, Zubak continues "if we accept or agree to the legalization of what has been done to Bosnia-Herzegovina and its peoples, it does not mean that we agree to what the aggressor actually wanted and to his goal." According to Zubak, this means that "we would be accepting part of the responsibility for the consequences of this war, and that is why we should not accept the maps without making this clear." Zubak says that he used the maps to illustrate that if the international community were really committed to enabling the return of all refugees, the Serb Republic would contain an equal number of Serbs and non-Serbs which makes it unnecessary for the entity to have the attribute Serb.

Zubak then goes on say that one of the reasons why he refused to initial the agreement is the "essentially changed geopolitical situation in the area, which opens possibilities for various arrangements regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina's political future." He says that the territorial demarcation and the "geopolitical and geographic position of the Serb Republic opens these possibilities, that is, the possibility of division, but also the possibility of using the Serb Republic as an instrument for drawing both the Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole into political or other integrations that are not in the interest of the Croat or Bosniak-Muslim peoples." He goes on to say that it was precisely Bosnian Posavina and a very narrow corridor that were the strongest guarantees against any future political integrations.

Zubak then says that "there are reasons which justify accepting the agreement." He says that the Croatian representatives spent two days debating the issue, which ended in the results with which the deputies have already been acquainted. "It is my duty to strive for the implementation of (?all points of the agreement), and that is why I support the adopted conclusion." He says that the entire international community rallied together to achieve the agreement, and that the most powerful military force, NATO, has been chosen to see that it is implemented. This, according to Zubak, guarantees an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other areas, which means that it is reason enough for accepting the peace agreement.

Following President Zubak's address, Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic takes the floor to express his views on the subject. He says that he has been wondering why "we were not speaking like this two, three years ago, because if we had, it would not have come to this." He says that "we were well aware of what we were doing in Dayton," and adds that willpower was the problem, and not only the international community's will.

Silajdzic goes on to say that the problem with the unjust territorial demarcation lies in the fact that "we were not in control of the territory." "Everything that was under our control, we have kept, and we have gained a little." Silajdzic reminds the deputies that in order to gain territory in Dayton, certain prerequisites had to be met: "First, we had to be in control of the territory; second, we had to have the support of at least the Republic of Croatia's delegation; third, we had to have the very important support of the United States; and fourth, we had to have the support of the Europeans." He goes on to say that in the case of Posavina, there was no support from the Republic of Croatia's delegation and no U.S. support.

Silajdzic then recapitulates events at the negotiations and reiterates that the Republic of Croatia's delegation failed to show any support for the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation regarding Posavina and eastern Bosnia. He then says that the only option would be to continue the war, and gives reasons why the war should not be continued. "I believe that the country can be reintegrated in other ways, ways envisaged by the Dayton agreement." He expresses his belief that everything can be solved peacefully, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina can be slowly reintegrated.

Silajdzic goes on to say that "Bosnia-Herzegovina is a victim of aggression, a victim of noncooperation by the Croatian leadership, and this is the problem. It should be a lesson for us, so that in the future, if there is ever a Dayton 2 or 3, it will never again happen that the aggressor manages to separate us, introduce dissent among us, thus forcing us to fight one another. This is the main problem. Had we resisted the aggressor together, none of this would have happened, and Posavina and eastern Bosnia would be (?ours). Thank you."

Following Silajdzic, Zubak again takes the floor and says that we should not wonder now what would have been if things had been different. "The Dayton agreement, such as it is, is a result of cooperation and agreement between the Croatian and Bosniak peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their presidents and legitimate representatives of the Federation and Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

He is followed by Ivan Bender, speaker of the Herzeg-Bosnian Parliament. First of all, Bender praises Assembly Speaker Prlic for refusing to interrupt the debate on the Dayton Accord in order to determine the makeup of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation, which will travel to Paris for the signing of the peace accord.

"Prime Minister Silajdzic (?on several occasions) pointed his finger at the Croatian leadership and the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatian state. I believe that this is not good. Let us not raise the issues that will divide and disunite us again," he implores, "let us not return to those matters and issues that could again result in something that nobody here wants." "I hope that this Dayton package safeguards peace for all three peoples on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, for the Croats, the Muslims, and the Serbs, as this is the only way to restore peace on these territories. When two agree on something, the third one has to accept certain things, too. This is definitely the way to ensure a life better than ours for the younger generations, to pass on to them something that we did not have."

Bender admits that the agreement is "a compromise" and that the reactions of the Croats from Posavina and other parts are justified. "However, it is a fact," Bender says, "I have said yesterday that this was Pax Americana, that the United Nations, the European Union, and what is most important the United States stood behind it. Let us look for a compromise [word indistinct], however, let us also leave a chance and a possibility, as Mr. Zubak and others have said, to resolve the matters that we cannot solve at present. If we do not accept the peace now, dear gentlemen, the alternative is war. Let us not call for war in his high house because I believe that it will not bring anything good to any of the peoples. There have been too many casualties here already. In the name of the Croatian people, I state with full responsibility that the Croats are not the losers in this war. Both goals that we have set ourselves can be accomplished. The Croatian state is here, the Federation is here, and within this we can accomplish what we agreed upon."

Bender continues by saying, "By accepting Dayton, with all its shortcomings, I believe that we can safeguard peace on these territories and through peace and political solutions seek what should be ours. The maps proposed and adopted here, 51 versus 49 percent, everything that is [word indistinct], however, this is how it was written and signed and I believe that we should accept it as such and search for solutions [word indistinct] by other means."

Bender is then followed by Ivo Komsic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency. He says that only "the truth can help us out of the confusion caused by the Dayton agreement." He believes the truth should be told about the circumstances in which the agreement was signed as well as the possible consequences of the agreement. As Komsic says, "all members of our delegation were against such a territorial solution." He says that the delegation was faced with accepting either the agreement or the consequences of its rejection. Komsic says that the motives that led some of the members of the delegation to oppose its initialing was injustice of the inclusion of Posavina into the Serbian entity and the ensuing weakening of the Federation and the weakening of the Croatian presence within the Federation. "We did not need to lose Posavina canton," Komsic said, "had we sported a firmer stance" and had we not abandoned the position that "the maps be discussed on the principle established by the Contact Group map."

Komsic remarks that had we stuck to the principle of the military situation on the ground, we would have been better off, too. "This did not need to happen and that is why it is painful," Komsic exclaims. "We must be fair," he continues, "and admit that with the agreement we preserved the institutions of the common state—the parliament, the government, the presidency—and we managed to secure about 70 percent of what we have been striving for, however, as regards the maps we are not happy."

At the end, Komsic urges the deputies "to lift the moral burden from the president of the Federation who acted the way he did in expectation of the decisions by the aforementioned bodies and this assembly." As he says, Komsic himself could not take the responsibility for the signing of the agreement without knowing what the decision of the assembly would be. "Your decision will simultaneously lift the moral burden as well as [word indistinct] of Mr. Prlic who initialed the agreement."

Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister, is the next one to speak. As he says, he initialed the Dayton accord "because nothing could be changed there and because I was aware of the negative consequences that would emerge if it were not signed." Prlic stresses the importance of the London conference, at which "the unanimous support was extended for Bosnia-Herzegovina," the formation of the coordinating commission that will decide on all important matters, and the appointment of Carl Bildt as the senior representative. As Prlic says, "Bildt will have extremely great powers, as some believe, if you carefully read the annexes forwarded to you, he will play the role of the Bosnia-Herzegovina governor with the powers that in my opinion exceed the authorities bestowed on the legitimate organs by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution."

Prlic concludes by saying, "Now that we can [word indistinct] perspective for the people who live on this territory, we, as the representatives of the people, and especially you, who were elected by the people, should not [words indistinct] to ensure a more permanent session of this parliament at which [words indistinct] contribute to the creation of a general climate that will allow the creation of the essential bodies which will

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

realize the peace process and ensure a life better than the one at present."

Reserves Right To Void Accord

LD1212194595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1900 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] An hour and a half after the federation parliament ended its work, the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina began a session. [passage omitted]

Following a lengthy discussion, the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted by a majority of votes the draft constitutional law on the amendments and addenda to the constitution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which enables the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to reform its internal setup in accordance with the constitution of the republic and within the framework of the international peace agreement.

According to the assembly's decision, the constitutional law takes immediate effect.

Another amendment is that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina reserves the right to proclaim the international peace agreement null and void if it is not implemented, and to continue functioning as an internationally recognized and sovereign state. [passage omitted]

Officials Consider Implications of Dayton Accord

Federation Minister Prlic

AU1212205395 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 95 p 5

[Interview with Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister and defense minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Faruk Cardzic; place and date not given: "I Am Not a Representative of the Croatian State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jadranko Prlic, defense minister and deputy prime minister in the governments of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, answered questions about the main characteristics of the negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, as well as of the post-Dayton events.

[Cardzic] You were at the assembly meeting at the moment when Vladimir Srebrov spoke. I guess his statement could not have left you unimpressed. Why did not you take the floor?

[Prlic] If I were to reply to everybody's assertions, I probably would not be doing anything else. I do not think that the debate, at least the part I was present at, was relevant and that it objectively reflected either the situation or the objective attitude of the Serbian people, on behalf of which Srebrov was apparently trying to speak. Those are his personal views, and I respect them. In a democratic society anybody has a right to state his or her attitudes.

The Plan Did Not Exist

[Cardzic] After Dayton, at the reception at President Tudjman's, Mr. Zubak [president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and Mr. Tadic were missing. There is speculation here about their removal and a seizure of power in Herzeg-Bosnia by the so-called Herzegovina lobby.

[Prlic] You have already answered the question yourself. Which is, those are speculations.

[Cardzic] And why were the aforementioned gentlemen absent from Zagreb?

[Prlic] I do not know.

[Cardzic] Behind the stage in Dayton the news leaked out about the letter that the Croatian part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation sent to the international mediators, warning them about the presence of mujahidin and fighters from Sandzak in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Prlic] Such a letter has never been written, although the problem of mujahidin has to be resolved, as well as the problem of all foreign citizens in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This principle is an integral part of the Dayton peace accords. All of them have to leave the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina within 30 days after the signing of the peace.

[Cardzic] What is the cooperation between the sides like in that regard?

[Prlic] Each side has to implement the Dayton accords.

[Cardzic] Rumors say that in Dayton you had a ready plan for the internal division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three entities. Did you propose that plan, and what it was all about?

[Prlic] Such a plan did not exist at any moment.

[Cardzic] We have found out that in the last night of negotiations, following demands by the Croatian part of our delegation, the Federation lost the railway hub at Doboj and Mt. Ozren, while in return it got Odzak. What is the reason for that exchange?

[Prlic] There is no truth in it. The Croatian part was not involved in the negotiations about maps at all.

[Cardzic] Do you believe in the competence of the Tribunal in The Hague, and do you consider that Croats indicted for war crimes ought to appear before the judge there as well?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Prlic] All persons, not only Croats, but Bosniaks and Serbs as well, who committed war crimes ought to appear there.

The Winning Party

[Cardzic] Could you comment on the charges brought against Blaskic, Kordic, and other Croats?

[Prlic] Charges are not commented on. Those people are still here. A charge is a charge, in any legal system. A person is a war criminal at the moment when he is sentenced as such by the court. Until then, he is innocent from the legal and any other point of view.

[Cardzic] Although you are a minister in two Bosnia-Herzegovina governments, you claim that you represent unique state interests of the Republic of Croatia. Why are you behaving in such a way?

[Prlic] I behave the way I think I should. I do not want to adjust to anybody. I shall try to state my attitude regarding both of your questions. I am not a representative of the Croatian state here, but you know that the winning party in the elections and the one that promotes the interests of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. It actually won 99 percent of votes at the first multiparty elections on which all the sides base their legitimacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That party is the winning party in the Republic of Croatia as well. Since the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sister party to the HDZ of Croatia, that means that they pursue the same policy. When I say that I am pursuing the unique Croatian state policy, that springs from that political legitimacy, which is quite indisputable.

[Cardzic] Can you expound your view some more?

[Prlic] You cannot deny a right to all the Croats living here to claim room for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in such a Bosnia-Herzegovina as they consider it should be like. Some 80 percent of reintegration depends on Serbs, and 20 percent of it depends on us. Of course, nobody agrees with me. We cannot think, particularly not those who consider themselves to be exclusive bearers of central authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that all they do is absolutely correct. Poor results that are being achieved cannot be justified.

[Cardzic] But you are a minister of Bosniaks, not only of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Prlic] First of all, I do not claim any right for myself, or for any Croat, that will not exist for Bosniak Muslims. If your neighbor does not own anything, and I do, that means nothing. Which is to say, there is no way you can live in that community.

[Cardzic] Then where is the problem?

[Prlic] What is most detrimental is that the Croats are getting a minority syndrome. Not in the sense of constitutional-legal system, although this was questionable as well, but it has to do with their closing into ghettos, separate municipalities, and so forth. Which means that the majority people need to reexamine themselves why that is happening. I do not want any right for the Croatian people that would be accomplished at the expense of the Bosniak Muslim people. What I did, I did in certain circumstances and I achieved some results. And nobody has mentioned yet—none of the media in Sarajevo—that we were facing the possible fall of Bihac and the total collapse of the state early in August, and yet we started on the Dayton negotiations with 52.6 percent of the territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council].

[Box, p 5]

[Cardzic] Will the Federation take root starting 1 January, as announced?

[Prlic] It will not take root starting 1 January, but it will begin to function to the extent possible. What does it mean to take root? That means that the entire legal and other systems are functioning. We have not even constructed our legal system yet.

[Cardzic] Are there any realistic grounds, as the Federation is beginning to take root, that all wages in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be leveled, without cutting wages in Herzeg-Bosnia?

[Prlic] Yes, there are! When speaking of standards, there is high flexibility regarding more or less all prices, except for wages. Only wages cannot be cut. I, as the prime minister of the government of Herzeg-Bosnia, will not allow any cut in wages in the territory under the HVO control, and there will be no leveling at a lower level. We have to endeavor that all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina get to an approximately same standard.

Croat Assembly Leader Bender

AU1212160795 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 95 p 7

[Interview with Ivan Bender, "chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," by Jozo Pavkovic and Gorden Knezovic in Mostar; date not given: "We Will Find a Satisfactory Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the approach of 14 December, when the Dayton Agreement is to be signed in Paris, the pressures to change it, the guesses regarding

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

those changes are intensifying, and the analysts' estimations regarding the feasibility of its implementation differ. The day of the signing of the document is approaching relentlessly, and nobody has been enthusiastic about the compromise achieved in the agreement. All the sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina are to make certain preparations before the signing. The session of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia is to take place in Mostar on 9 December, the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to take place on 11 December, and before that, on 8 December, the highest Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and SDA [Party of Democratic Action] officials will hold talks in Sarajevo.

We talked to Ivan Bender, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and chairman of the Club of Croat Representatives in the Constituent Assembly, about the activities of Croat officials in the implementation of the assumed obligations and about the current political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Implementation of the Dayton Agreement

[VECERNJI LIST] In what way will the federal institutions take over the authorities?

[Bender] Preparations toward fulfilling the obligations arising from the Dayton Agreement are under way, and the HDZ is organizing and preparing everything needed for the implementation of the agreement. Through the authorized state and party institutions, we will prepare the stands of Croat representatives for the Constituent Assembly. Before the session of the Chamber of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly, the talks between the highest representatives of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SDA will take place, on which occasion we will have to reach an agreement on the disputed issues. The Dayton Agreement has imposed certain changes to the very constitution of the federation, as well as to the overall functioning of the authorities. We should also, with our federal partner, discuss our common stands, with which we will then enter the talks with the Serbs, because it is a fact that there can be no peace without an agreement between all three nations. We will also have to make arrangements on the new territorial and administrative organization of municipalities and cantons in the federation.

[VECERNJI LIST] The greatest difficulty will be the many technical problems regarding the establishment of the federal institutions?

[Bender] To enable the federation to function, it is necessary to organize all its authorities, from the lowest authorities in the municipalities to the cantonal and central authorities. This process has not been completed in the municipalities yet, and we are facing a new organization of cantons and the central organs of the Federation. We are also facing intensive talks between parties, with the arbitration of Roberts Owen and on the recommendation of the mediator, Christian Schwartz-Schilling. A EU Monitoring Mission team is assisting in the constitution of transitional municipal councils.

As for difficulties, I must point out those in Bugojno and Vares, because it will be difficult to establish cantons over there if transitional municipal councils are not constituted. The Muslim side in those municipalities is "braking" the process of the implementation of the federation by asking for new arbitration and a new interpretation of the Federal Constitution. There are also problems in the constitution of the federal authorities in Stolac, Capljina, and Rama, but they will be overcome very soon.

It is also very important that Sarajevo is organized in the same way that Mostar has been organized, so that the Croats in Sarajevo are given their own municipality. Here, one has to know that the system of authority that is currently functioning will remain in force as long as the federal authority is not established. Only matters determined by the constitution will be decided upon on the level of the federation, but there will also have to be some changes, because there is also the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to which the Constitution of the Federation is to be coordinated.

Whom Did Komsic Represent?

[VECERNJI LIST] Is it possible that Sarajevo will determine who will represent the Croats, as happened when they included Dr. Ivo Komsic [Bosnian Presidency member] in the Bosnian-Herzegovina delegation at Dayton?

[Bender] In Dayton, the Croats were represented by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, as the president of the Croats, and our representatives in the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation—Zubak, Prlic, and Tadic. Whom did Komsic represent? You should ask him. He certainly did not represent the Croats, and I think he should have established better cooperation with the Croatian representatives. In the coming period, we will be bound to appoint our representatives in the federal institutions. We just have to choose those who we know will and can protect Croat interests. Every deputy minister has the right to veto any decision made by the minister if that decision violates the vital interests of one nation.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[VECERNJI LIST] Have the Croat representatives in the central bodies of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina been chosen?

[Bender] We are only to discuss the distribution of functions on Friday. For the time being, the only certainties are those confirmed at the party [HDZ] Presidency session and accepted at the Presidential Council: the resignations offered by President Zubak and Kordic and the appointment of Ivo Lozancic as the president of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina, M.Sc. Vladimir Soljic as the president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and myself as the candidate for president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia.

[VECERNJI LIST] What do you think about the founding of the war presidency of the town of Neum?

[Bender] I have seen it in the papers, and I think it is ridiculous and spiteful, because there is no reason for it. Before the war, the Muslims constituted 4 percent of the population of Neum, and they had two representatives in the Municipal Assembly. I think they should not do this when we are establishing the federation, and we will talk with the Muslim side about this on Friday.

Changes in Herzeg-Bosnia

[VECERNJI LIST] What will be your task as the president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia?

[Bender] If my election is confirmed in the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, there will certainly be changes to the work and behavior of the institutions of Herzeg-Bosnia. I think we need more order, coordination, and systematic work. The Presidential Council will take over all the obligations resulting from the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution of the Federation, and personnel changes will certainly take place in the structures of Herzeg-Bosnia, as well as in the Presidential Council itself. The Presidential Council, apart from the HDZ, will continue to be a firm supporter of the protection of Croat interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the continuity of Croat policy will also be maintained.

[VECERNJI LIST] In what way have the indictments against six Croat leaders influenced the relations between the partners in the federation?

[Bender] The Muslim leadership stands behind those indictments. We will take all legal measures to protect those against whom legal proceedings have been instigated, and we will also cooperate with the tribunal in The Hague. We will do everything within the legal institutions to protect the accused Croats.

[VECERNJI LIST] The public of Herzeg-Bosnia is bitter, because the Croat side has not brought charges against the Muslims who committed war crimes.

[Bender] Our authorized institutions have neither brought charges against criminals, nor have we presented documents on the crimes and the criminals to the public. Some of the material has been delivered to the tribunal in The Hague, and we still have a some of the documents that charge the most responsible and highest political and military leaderships of the Muslim and Serb nations. We are handling it carefully and with responsibility, and all those who are guilty of crimes will be held responsible.

[VECERNJI LIST] Under pressure from the Muslim side, the Croats have removed from office two of the heads of the HDZ for Bosnia-Herzegovina. For how long will the Croats accept such pressures?

[Bender] The Croats have accepted the resignations of the two highest HDZ leaders with the goal of achieving better cooperation between the federal partners and because of the overall Croat policy, and not because they wanted us to do so. That is just proof of our readiness to cooperate and unless they are as cooperative, I will do everything not to lose Croat personnel. I think those were our last concessions of that kind. We have both the strength and knowledge to protect Croat interests in an agreed way through the implementation of the federation and confederation with Croatia. In this period, we need patience and confidence in President Tudjman and the HDZ, and we should not allow some individuals among us to question things that we have already taken care of. Local interests have to be subordinated to the overall Croat interests, and we will find a satisfactory solution for those who have come out worst, and those are the Croats from Bosnian Posavina.

[Box, p 7]

Confederation—An Alternative Route

[VECERNJI LIST] What about the part of the Washington Agreement regarding the establishment of confederal relations between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia?

[Bender] The process of the establishment of confederal relations will take an alternative route because the agreement on a integral Bosnia-Herzegovina within the internationally recognized borders has been reached. The guarantors of the status of the Croats as a constituent nation in the new circumstances are the Croatian Army and police, and the formation of the Common Council for the Cooperation of Croatia and the Federation of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bosnia-Herzegovina will be a substitute for confederal links.

Ambassador to Croatia Trnka

AU1212145495 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 29 Nov 95 pp 7-8

[Interview with Kasim Trnka, ambassador of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, by Zehrudin Isakovic; place and date not given: "The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This interview with Ambassador Kasim Trnka was inspired by the agreement initialed in Dayton, which is to be signed in mid-December in Paris. At the beginning of the interview, Mr. Trnka briefly pointed out the good and the bad sides of this initialed agreement.

[Trnka] You see, this is a very complex agreement, which has a great number and variety of aspects. In short, we could say that, with this agreement, we have agreed on the constitutional arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina, its internal division, the military aspect of the implementation of the agreement, the return of refugees, and a number of other things. All this also includes the lifting of the arms embargo, the program of economic aid for the reconstruction and development of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and finally, our joining the political and military organizations and integrations in Europe and the world. Saying that, I have in mind, primarily the European Union and the NATO alliance and cooperation with the war crimes tribunal. Therefore, in order to give an evaluation on what is good and what is bad in this agreement, one should bear all those elements in mind. Quite certainly, one of the most positive things is that the territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina has doubtlessly been preserved. That means that, on one side, the international legal continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved, and, on the other side, the internal legal continuity of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been preserved. In the documents, it has been said that this is a transformation of its constitutional arrangement and not the creation of a new state. So, it is a state that has its head, and that is the tripartite presidency, and then the parliament, which consist of two houses—of which the lower house expresses the multiparty political structure of the entire country and will consist of 42 members who will be elected at direct free elections on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That state will have its council of ministers, which will perform the functions of the government; it will also have its constitutional court, which, just like all the other institutions mentioned, will have a significant number of competences that integrate the central authorities. Primarily, I have in mind foreign affairs, foreign trade, customs, budget and finances, the central bank, the single currency, communications....

[Isakovic] Does that mean that, for example, the concluding of a trade contract of a certain firm on the territory of the Serb entity will have to be carried out through central institutions?

[Trnka] No. Business relations are always maintained directly throughout the world. Business relations are never made through state, however, the policy of foreign trade—customs protection, export stimulations.... will be a competence of central institutions. That means that, for example, customs control, at the moment goods enter or exit the country, will have to be under the jurisdiction of the institutions of the central government. Further, there is the citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is regulated by the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina. True, there will also be the citizenships of the two entities, but in international relationships, only the citizenship of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be relevant. In other words, passports will have to have exclusively the symbols of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A section of the constitution regulates the highest standards in the sphere of human freedoms and rights, monitored by international factors. In that respect, a special place is given to the complex of issues that concern the return of exiled people. The right to return is guaranteed for all of them, together with the right to compensation for all those whose property has been destroyed or cannot be returned. A third aspect of the agreement is the military section of the implementation of the agreement. Sixty thousand well-armed and well-trained soldiers, who will be under the control of NATO, are coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is significantly different than the situation so far. From the moment the agreement is definitely signed—and that, I hope, will be done in Paris in mid-December—the countdown of precise times and deadlines will start, in which the commander of the international forces will be authorized to use force against any side that does not withdraw from the demarcation lines. In the context of force, meaning military force, there is a section on the balance of military power in the region, where the proportion of forces between the so-called Yugoslavia, on one side, and Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other, is regulated. You know that the UN Security Council has passed the resolution on the lifting of the arms embargo. But, that is not a definite lifting of the arms embargo, it is tied to the process of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The embargo on the import of light weapons has already been lifted, whereas the import of heavy arms, of airplanes, and of sophisticated weapons will still have to be delayed. If any of the sides does

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

not cooperate in the implementation of the agreement, then the embargo will be thoroughly lifted for the opposite side. And if the implementation goes through without problems, the embargo will be completely lifted for all the sides after the international forces for its enforcement leave the area.

[Isakovic] Let us clear up one thing from the constitution as seen by the Dayton Agreement. None of the entities has the right to carry out a referendum on secession after a certain time?

[Trnka] No. The entities have the right to establish special, mainly cultural, ties with neighboring countries, but those relations must not be contrary to the territorial sovereignty and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor opposed to any of the vital interests of the motherland. The contracts with the neighboring countries must be confirmed by the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs have the possibility of preventing a decision if they do not agree with it. Roughly, that should mean that the entities cannot conclude contracts on military or political cooperation, but that they can have contracts in the spheres of the economy, culture, education, information....

[Isakovic] Is there a possibility that, because of this right to, so to say, a national veto, which you have just mentioned, there could be a blockade of the work of the central parliament?

[Trnka] Yes, that is what I intended to point out when I come to talking about the bad sides of the Dayton Agreement. That is, objectively, a problem that we tried to overcome. We have found some solutions, but not completely. But let us go back to the positive sides of the recently signed agreement. For example, all the members of the Contact Group, and also a wider international community, have taken on the responsibility of giving big material aid for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is some mention of $5 billion, but it is still not clear whether those $5 billion include the part of the old Yugoslav debts that are assigned to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Isakovic] Is that money intended for the federation only, or for the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Trnka] The idea is that the delivery of that aid should be tied to the extent to which the peace agreement and human rights are respected. That means that those who do not allow the refugees to return and who do not accept the international control over the respect of those obligations will receive no economic aid.

[Isakovic] Can you give us an appraisal of the dangers, or, rather, the bad sides of this agreement?

[Trnka] It is bad that, in the beginning, the demarcations between the entities will be rigid, because the armies will remain on both sides, just like the police, although it is stated in the constitution that there is the full freedom of movement of people, property, capital, information.... and that no entity can establish a border towards the other. However, it will of course be very hard to enforce that in the beginning. Furthermore, a relatively bad solution has been reached regarding Posavina. Then, we have also had to swallow one painful moral issue, namely that of the former "protected areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa. There is also the problem of Brcko, the solution of which has been prolonged for another year. Until that time, the status quo remains, which does not suit us.

[Isakovic] Let us dwell on Brcko for a while. What, in fact, is implied by Brcko? Which area?

[Trnka] That is the town of Brcko, its port, and the access to that area. Meaning, the cutting of the corridor. For the time being, we have secured international guarantees for an undisturbed functioning of the railroad and of the main roads leading from central Bosnia and the Tuzla region toward Brcko. Our delegation was ready to stop the talks if Brcko had been given to the Serb entity. Our condition was that the federation must have access to the Sava River and an uninterrupted railroad link from Ploce to Brcko, from where it would have other, international, communications. As for our other fears, they involve the implementation of what has been signed. The U.S. Congress could make some decisions that might stop an undisrupted realization of what has been agreed. Misunderstandings are also possible regarding the role of Russian troops....

[Isakovic] Can we clarify the case of Sarajevo a little bit? What, concretely, does the "unified city" mean?

[Trnka] The "unified city" implies that all municipalities of the city, including the peripheral ones, like Hadzici and Ilijas, are included in the federation. That means not only that the city will encompass a wider city area, but also that it will have exits to the south, north, and northeast. What remain under Serb control is the top of Mount Trebevic, Vraca, Kasindol, Lukavica, and the area towards Trnovo. At this moment, that is a good solution, because the greater part of the city is under the control of the federation.

[Isakovic] Serb army units, or more precise the Chetniks, will withdraw from Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas....?

[Trnka] Yes. They have to withdraw their military forces to the new separation lines of the entities, which by no means implies that the population that lives there at present will have to leave too. Those who are not

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

criminals and who respect the positive laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina can remain in their houses without any fear. Nobody will chase them away. However, if they wish to leave by themselves, we cannot and we do not want to prevent them. Honestly speaking, I believe that this solution still is, in a way, a division of Sarajevo, because one part of it still does remain under their command. There was an idea, which we elaborated on in great detail, that Sarajevo, with all of its 10 municipalities, should be a separate entity. In that case, Sarajevo would be neither in the federation nor in the Serb Republic. A separate district would be formed. However, the mechanisms of government of such a city would be very complex. So that, all in all, I believe that we have, still, managed to achieve a good solution for Sarajevo. I hope that it will be an embryo for the reintegration of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Isakovic] How did it come about that Doboj should remain in the Serb entity?

[Trnka] According to all the talks so far, Doboj was to remain in the Serb entity, and the railroad station and the railroad were to remain in the federation. However, according to such combinations it turned out that the federation should get 54, 55, or 56 percent of the territory, whereas we were pressured to go back to 51:49. Therefore we had to look for places that could be given back to the Serb Republic. It turned out that the best thing would be to return Mount Ozren, because that is a territory with an almost entirely Serb population anyway. And then, if Ozren is given to them, then it has to have some sort of connection with the rest of the Serb entity, and that connection can only go through Doboj. Then we counted that we will be able to use the railroad through that area around Doboj, which will be the case if everything goes as planned. If there comes to difficulties, there is a reserve variant, with the project for building a railroad from Maglaj to Banovici. Trains would no longer go through Doboj. In this way, the distance from the north to the south of the federation would be even shorter. The United States has promised to finance the building of that railroad, just like it has promised to help the building of a good traffic communication to Gorazde.

[Isakovic] Such variants with the railroad to Banovici prejudice, or in a way imply problems regarding the implementation and functioning of the reorganized state!

[Trnka] True. Our intention is, and this is what the whole concept is based on, not to have problems and to be able to use that railroad. But, we must secure ourselves in case things go wrong.

[Isakovic] Gorazde is not tied to the federation with a "corridor," but a "territorial connection." Is the difference in the "thickness" of the connection?

[Trnka] Yes. That territorial connection is some 20-km wide, which also includes a fairly good stretch of the Drina River. We have calculated that, on the part of the Drina River that belongs to the federation, it is possible to build two or three hydroelectric dams.

[Isakovic] Trnovo remains under Serb control and within the Serb entity?

[Trnka] Unfortunately. But there is a road leading from Mount Igman to Gorazde, which will be included in the federation.

[Isakovic] It is evident that the signed agreement is unjust. But little is known of what would have happened had Izetbegovic's delegation not signed it. What was the alternative to the signing of the peace agreement in Dayton?

[Trnka] At this moment, the whole world is focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The U.S. Administration has, in a way, linked a good part of its preelection campaign to the solution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some sort of consensus has been achieved between Europe, the United States, and Russia regarding Bosnia, including the arrival of the forces that are to enforce the agreement. Had we not signed, had we gambled away such international circumstances, we would probably have been pushed from the center of interest and there would no longer be any attention or readiness to offer help. The world would probably have given us up, lifted the embargo, and left to us to our own fight. They would have said: "There, you can fight, no matter what comes out of it!" On the other hand, for the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is necessary to have urgent peace and a developed democracy. The continuation of the war would lead to further losses among our people and further migrations from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even the better prepared ones can hardly endure the efforts of war for longer than four years. It is also very uncertain if, in such surroundings, we could end the war successfully in a military way. Unfortunately, we are not a numerous people, and we cannot afford so many casualties and a disintegration of population. We have to start with the process of the return of our refugees urgently, so that they could join the reconstruction of the country as soon and effectively as possible. We have to take particular care of the intellectuals who should be the pillars of that development.

[Isakovic] So you seem to agree with the remark by President Izetbegovic that, in the world as it is today, what has been achieved is—the maximum!

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Trnka] I think that that is perhaps the best way to formulate it. In the world as it is today, we could not have achieved more. We are sure that this is not a just peace, because the aggressor has, to a large degree, been rewarded. One of the biggest weaknesses of this agreement is that, whether we want to admit it or not, we have, in fact, legalized the Serb Republic, and the army that has been an aggressor and criminal army so far has now become the legal army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is the high price we have paid, and that is the big shortcoming of this peace agreement, but—that is just the way it is. In order to compensate for those shortcomings, we will insist on the following: The existing authorities will go on with their work until the new elections; the inclusion of the Serbs from the occupied parts into the authorities will be conditional on respect for human rights and freedoms, allowing the refugees to return under the control of international factors, cooperation with the International Tribunal for War Crimes, and the reconstruction of political power, in which there must be no people suspected of war crimes. So the Serbs will not take part in the authorities as long as the elections are not carried out, and they will be monitored by the international community.

[Isakovic] What about the armies?

[Trnka] In the far future in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there will be one army. For the time being, the constitution anticipates that police control over all armies will be performed by the presidency, and that the presidency is to form a permanent military committee that, beside the members of the presidency, would include a certain number of people responsible for military questions, and the action of the existing armies should be coordinated in that way. There is an explicit provision in the constitution that no army may act against the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor one against another within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Isakovic] What do you expect of the elections that should be carried out in the course of next year? Will they be free and will they significantly change the political situation within Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Trnka] I expect that the international community will get involved in that work. We have asked it to carry out the elections. But, as it seems, they will only be able to supervise them. However, they will have the right to take disciplinary measures against those who do not respect the rules of the elections that will be established by an international commission that will follow up on the total course of the elections. Not only the inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina who are in the country at present will have the right to take part in the elections, but also the refugees will be able to vote for the authorities from the towns and countries in which they are at the time. We have insisted that everyone should vote for the authorities of the municipality in which they lived during the census of 1992 [as published]. In that way, we would eliminate the results of ethnic cleansing. Also, in that way, the authorities installed would correspond to the structure of the population at least to a degree. Of course, the Serb side was against it. A compromise solution has been adopted. In principle, the voting must be carried out according to the 1991 census. The international commission will also allow voting by those who happen to be on a certain territory. There is a provision—I would like you to write this because LJILJAN is read all over the world—that says that the voting of the refugees will be interpreted as an expression of the will of refugees to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I would like to draw their attention to the fact that their participating in the elections will by no means question their refugee status in that country. A number of countries have guaranteed that. Besides, procedures regarding refugees will be solved bilaterally with each of the countries.

[Isakovic] The world media have devoted a lot of their programming, a lot of space, to descriptions of the negotiations themselves. They mentioned various pressures, "hard" talks, insults.... Can you convey to us a part of that atmosphere?

[Trnka] One should remember the negotiations before Dayton. At that time, Holbrooke and his assistants circled from Belgrade to Zagreb, via Sarajevo, and through various European cities. That principle was then continued, with the difference that everybody was now in one town, or rather in one base. Each delegation had a separate building. Holbrooke went from one delegation to another, and, at the same time, parallel meetings were held on various levels. Crucial issues were discussed with the heads of delegations, less important issues were solved on lower levels, whereas the elaboration of those ideas was discussed with experts. After all sides were consulted on one problem, the Americans, in coordination with Europeans and Russians, made a draft of a document, which was then offered to the sides for consideration, and they gave their opinion on it. Based on those opinions, in case they did not agree, a new version was made. The constitution, which is what I worked on most, had, I believe, around 10 versions. Their goal was to achieve a compromise, and we often protested to the Americans because of that approach. We asked them whether they cared about principles or only some artificial middle line. Unfortunately, what they wanted was any sort of agreement; various compromises that were sometimes so general that there could be difficulties during their realization. There was pressure

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

from the entire world public that this war be stopped. The fact that the one who stopped the talks would have carried the greatest responsibility says enough.

[Isakovic] At the very end, it was very dramatic?

[Trnka] In the last variant, when we said that we would not accept the map without Brcko, they told us: "We are giving you an ultimatum: Either you accept it, or we stop it all!" Then the last version turned out to be, as our delegation had suggested, that the issue of Brcko would be delayed.

[Isakovic] That saved the conference?

[Trnka] Yes, because even the postponement of the solution is some sort of solution.

[Isakovic] At the end, what is the name of our state?

[Trnka] Simply: Bosnia-Herzegovina. The change of name does not mean anything in particular. There are many countries that are called only by their name, like Canada, Australia....This perhaps somewhat naked name is a product of a compromise, since the Serbs did not want the notion of a state to be stressed, with which, unfortunately, some Croatian people agreed. But, what matters to us is the essence, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, according to this peace agreement, is a state with all its characteristics.

[Box, p 8]

[Isakovic] Can you comment on the resignations submitted in Dayton? First Zubak [president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] and Tadic [justice minister].

[Trnka] As for Zubak and Mate Tadic, I think that this should be understood precisely from the standpoint that they come from Posavina, which has, for the most part, remained in the Serb entity. So those announced resignations should be understood.

[Isakovic] Sacirbegovic?

[Trnka] His resignation came as a result of the federal agreement that separated the governments of the republic and the federation. It was agreed that, in the central organs, Alija Izetbegovic should remain as the president of the presidency, after which the Croats insisted on either the post of prime minister or that of minister of foreign affairs on the central level, since there are no foreign affairs on the level of the federation. Then it was agreed that the minister of foreign affairs should be a Croat.

[Box, p 8]

[Isakovic] Mr. Trnka, if you were, for example, from Foca or from Prijedor, would you have approved of this peace agreement?

[Trnka] That depends on the ability of the person to keep in mind the collective interest, to separate the collective from the individual interest. But, I come from Sarajevo, and it is easier for me to think that way since Sarajevo belongs to the federation.

[Isakovic] There is confusion among the Serb delegation. As a matter of fact, the agreement was only signed by Milosevic?

[Trnka] Yes. Legally the situation is completely clear there, because the Bosnian Serbs gave Milosevic written authorization to represent them in this matter. According to that authorization, his signature is legitimate. The Pale Serbs have thus accepted the agreement, although, allegedly, Koljevic and Krajisnik fainted.

Pilots' Release Described as 'Goodwill' Gesture

AU1312143895 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Report by Darko Milosevic from Zvornik]

[FBIS Translated Text] This gesture of humanism and goodwill of the Serb side resulted from the talks held today in Zvornik between Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic, RS [Serb Republic] Army chief of General Staff, and General Jean-Philippe Douin, head of the Joint Headquarters of the French Armed Forces. The meeting was also attended by Lieutenant General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the FRY Army General Staff, as well as the French and Russian military envoys to Belgrade, Gen. (Vialla) and Gen. (Sopilov).

In a brief statement made after the talks, the Information Service of the RS Army General Staff pointed out that this move was a sign of high respect for the long and lasting friendship between the Serbian and French nations and a concrete contribution by the Serb side to a successful end to the peace process and the upcoming Paris conference. In a statement to a large number of representatives of almost all mayor foreign news agencies, Gen. Mladic expressed the hope that all soldiers captured on any side would be treated in a similar fashion, but also that he expected actions similar to the NATO air strikes would never be repeated.

The liberated French pilots left Zvornik at 1430 hours sharp, and Gen. Douin personally informed French President Jacques Chirac about their release while the pilots were still on the territory of Serb Republic.

Serbs Expect French Support

AU1312141795 Paris AFP in English 1328 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec 13 (AFP)—The Bosnian Serbs expect France

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

to support their demands for changes to the Bosnia peace deal, following the Serb release of two French airmen, Bosnian Serb media indicated Wednesday [13 December].

Media reports in this Bosnian Serb stronghold said the "kind gesture" by the Serbs to release the pilots, held for more than three months, should encourage reciprocal action from France and the international community at Thursday's ceremony in Paris, where the Bosnia peace accords are to be signed.

Serb "parliament speaker" Momcilo Krajisnik told Radio-Pale in particular that the international community could not ignore the parallels between the release of the airmen and the demands for liberation raised by the Serb population of Sarajevo.

The Bosnian capital's Serbs have bitterly criticised the peace deal, reached at Dayton, Ohio, last month, as it provides for their reintegration into a unitary Sarajevo under Bosnian Government control.

"The people have made their opinion known," Krajisnik said, referring to the numerous demonstrations in Serb-held suburbs of Sarajevo protesting the Dayton accords.

"We hope that Europe has not forgotten democracy and the right to self-determination," he added.

A radio commentator added that if the international community had thrown all its weight into getting the two French airmen liberated, it really could not refuse to consider the right of the Serb population of Sarajevo to liberation.

Bosnian Serb army General Ratko Mladic said earlier Tuesday as the two rmen were handed over that he hoped the Serbs coulo rely on the "understanding of the international community and of France" at Thursday's signing ceremony.

France has stressed it did not make any concessions to secure the release of Captain Frederic Chiffot and Lieutenant Jose-Manuel Souvignet.

SPS Said 'Prompting' Serbs To Leave Sarajevo

AU1212152095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 95 p 9

[Article by N.T.: "SPS Evacuating Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—The Socialist Party of Serbia is publicly saying that the Serbs should not be leaving Serb Sarajevo, but its emissaries have been visiting Sarajevo citizens by night and prompting them to leave. This was said at a news conference yesterday by Predrag Golubovic, deputy chairman of the Serbian National Renewal [SNO].

The exodus of Serbs from Serb Sarajevo would destabilize the Serb Republic and provide Slobodan Milosevic with an opportunity to discredit Radovan Karadzic as incapable of holding power, Golubovic explained.

Serbs Hold Referendum on Status of Sarajevo

Right to Self-Determination

LD1212204295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1916 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Dec (SRNA)—The referendum on Serb Sarajevo will demonstrate to the world that the Serbs have their roots here and want no rotten compromise and Muslim authority. This was said today by Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic.

"I want to believe that Europe has not forgotten democracy and the right of a people to self-determination. If this decision made by the people is accepted, this will be a great contribution to the implementation of the peace agreement," Krajisnik stressed in a statement for Serb Television. He added:

"Otherwise, this will be a great mistake, as those who want to implement some measures by force are not aware of what kind of gamble they are letting themselves in for."

The Assembly speaker noted that one cannot accept the assurances that the Serbs are entitled to stay on in Sarajevo if they are based on an agreement, according to which Muslims should be in authority in this area, and said that this "is cynical and an invitation to the Serbs to leave this area."

Asked about what would happen after the referendum, Krajisnik said that "positive indications are emerging that reality must be taken into account."

"The most dangerous thing is to advocate one utopian solution that has not taken root in many areas—a solution of multiethnic reconciliation in the wake of a major civil war," he said.

He continued: "We want peace to prevail and to establish equality in this area, but the right of the Serb people cannot be ignored. It was clearly said as early as 1992 that the Serb people do not accept an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, something that has been confirmed through several referenda."

The president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, who took part in today's referendum, said he believes the Serbs will remain in their part of the city and politically defend their human and national rights.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Political Resistance to Accord

LD1112163595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1520 GMT 11 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 Dec (SRNA)—Trifko Radic, president of the war presidency of Serb Sarajevo, expects that at tomorrow's referendum citizens will offer political resistance to the international community which wants to use the Dayton agreement to expel them from the Sarajevo area.

"Judging from the reactions at rallies held so far, it is evident that the Serbs do not want to stay under Muslim rule under any circumstances and I expect that that is how they will vote tomorrow," Radic told SRNA and added that the Assembly of Serb Sarajevo organized the referendum at the request of citizens.

"The people are aware that the initialing of the agreement in Dayton can have worse effects than any bombardment. We want peace but we cannot accept such a solution for the status of Sarajevo," Radic said categorically.

"The departure of 140,000 Serbs will be a catastrophe. The Serb people do not deserve to be expelled by one signature after they won in the struggle for Serb Sarajevo," Radic said and repeated that the Serb citizens want their authorities in the parts of the city which they inhabit.

According to Radic, despite the fact that international mediators have been invited to attend the referendum tomorrow, there is a possibility that they will not come because they have so far ignored all demands by the citizens of Serb Sarajevo.

Overwhelming Vote Against Accord

LD1312121195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0050 GMT 13 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 13 Dec (SRNA)—According to the first official report by the central referendum commission, of the 85,189 voters on the electoral registers of Serb Sarajevo's nine urban municipalities 78,140 citizens, or 91.74 percent, have cast their vote.

The "against" ballots were cast by 77,190 citizens, or 98.78 percent of the votes cast, while 651 citizens, or 0.83 percent, voted "for" accepting the proviso of the Dayton agreement according to which Serb Sarajevo should be placed under Muslim authority. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Railroads Demand $37 Million in Transit Fees

AU1212174995 Paris AFP in English 1732 GMT 12 Dec 95

[Article by Jocelyne Zablit: "Croatia To Pocket Millions of Dollars by Taxing NATO Trains"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 12 (AFP)—Although NATO's operation in the Balkans calls for troops and equipment to move free of charge in the countries involved, Croatia expects to pocket more than $37 million from NATO trains crossing its territory.

"We expect 300 trains to arrive in Croatia" during the NATO operation, said Stjepan Bozicevic, head of the Croatian railway network. "The passage of each train would cost (NATO) approximately $125,000."

The bill includes customs, freight and travel charges as well as insurance, Bozicevic said.

He said Croatia had hired about 10 percent additional security personnel to guard the trains and ensure safe passage in areas largely devoid of railway traffic during nearly four years of war.

The first two trains transporting NATO communications equipment and trucks with satellite dishes arrived in the Croatian capital of Zagreb on Monday and Tuesday and five additional trains were expected during the week, NATO spokesman Major Jerry O'Hara said.

He said in addition to all the charges levied on each train, NATO has had to lease cranes at $150 an hour and fork-lifts at $40 an hour to offload the equipment. Every train has between 25 to 30 wagons full of equipment, each of which takes about 20 minutes to offload, he added.

"They're pretty smart, they got it all covered," he said when asked to comment on the hefty bill the alliance will have to pay Croatia during the historic operation to bring peace to the Balkans.

He said that the trains, which are coming from Germany and Hungary, are not covered by the Bosnia peace accord initialled in Dayton, Ohio last month because private companies are involved.

"This is a private company we are using," he said. "The agreement does not apply to us using private companies.

"We are paying for the transport but we will not pay any excise taxes."

Specifically, the Dayton accord states: "NATO will use airports, roads and ports without payment of duties, dues, tolls or charges."

"I guess the guy who wrote the accord forgot to add trains," joked one high-ranking UN official who requested anonymity.

He said that compared to the United Nations, which had to pay huge sums of money to have access to ports and airports in ex-Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will foot a less hefty bill.

"There is going to be a big change and the Croats will no longer be able to ask for $2 million a month for Ploce as they have so far," he added, referring to the Croatian port on the Adriatic coast which has been used by French UN troops during their mandate in ex-Yugoslavia.

Bozicevic, for his part, could not explain why his country was asking some $125,000 for each train.

"It's just like that, I don't know why," he said.

'Peaceful' Reintegration of Slavonia Doubted

AU1312125895 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 95 p 2

[Commentary by Bruno Lopandic: "The Deadline for Peaceful Reintegration Is Six Months!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The real solution for eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, which is the last remaining occupied territory in Croatia, has yet to be found. Formally recognized as an inseparable part of Croatian territory, but actually still under occupation, this region is awaiting the start of the peaceful reintegration by a so-called soft resolution, as the Americans like to call it. Yet, how is this soft resolution envisaged, and what are the plans for its realization?

According to an ideal scenario, in the course of December, a transitional administration should be appointed, whose task would be to deal with the issues that are not encompassed by the extremely flexible, general, and halfway defined basic agreement. This refers to the organization of civil life, most various institutions such as the service for payment operations, post offices, directions....The head of those transitional authorities will be, according to well-informed sources, a senior U.S. diplomat of great competence. Although his name is not yet known, a list of more than 20 names has been drawn up, while the Americans say that they will carefully select a man to head the transitional authorities, because, according to a U.S. diplomat, they want to make sure he is really a competent man who knows the situation to the last detail and the relations in the region. It is envisaged that those civilian authorities, in addition to the U.S. diplomat, are supposed to include: A representative of the Croatian state authorities, a representative

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the local Croats (if they are allowed to return), a representative of the local Serbs, and representatives of the other minorities that lived in the region before the Serbian aggression. According to the information available so far, it will most probably include a representative of the Hungarian minority. The architects of this idea, to which Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic have agreed, point out that, in contrast to the practice so far, these civilian authorities will be superior to the military forces in the field, which certainly represents a change. In that way, one is trying, in a political sense, to show willingness to follow the line of pacification and organization of civilian life. But, as is always the case in this region, there is a big "but" about the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem.

Since the very beginning of this arrangement, many things have been strange and forced, to put it mildly. Despite public reassurances by the Croatian authorities, it has become clear that the NATO troops will not be deployed in eastern Croatia. Because of a sort of vacuum that has come about since the expiration of the UNCRO [UN Confidence Retoration Operation in Croatia] mandate, that mandate has been extended to a little less than two months because of technical reasons. In the meantime, it has become clear that there will be great problems about the definition of the international forces in eastern Slavonia, which are supposed to be called the Task Force. Despite some indications, the Americans will most probably not be involved, so that, for the time being, a limit has been set by the existing Belgium and Russian units within the UNCRO. A formal change of the name of the forces that are actually part of the United Nations is quite questionable, considering the efficiency they have shown so far. That it is just a formality is shown by the indication that the senior U.S. diplomat heading the transitional administration will wear a UN badge. As for military units, the Canadians, who are already deployed within UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], have been called upon for help. Because of all this, the precise number of troops to be deployed in the remaining occupied regions of Croatia is still unknown. Besides, a financial problem has arisen: if the operation in eastern Slavonia is not linked with the United Nations, the countries whose troops are on the ground will have to pay all the costs themselves. Since, so far, none of the countries has shown any particular interest in that, many people say that, in the end, the efficient United Nations will manage to permeate the international forces, [and have it] wrapped up in an official formulation. If that happens, many questions will arise regarding the actual implementation on the ground. How will the demilitarization of the region be carried out in the first month? How are the militant Serbs supposed to be disarmed? Will the transitional authorities create the conditions for the functioning of the Croatian authorities? How will the return of the refugees be organized? At least some of these questions will be answered soon—after the signing of the peace accord in Paris.

On the very day of the signing in Paris, on 14 December, Butrus Butrus-Ghali must submit the text of the resolution of eastern Slavonia to the UN Security Council. Because of all the reasons stated above, foreign diplomats consider the issue of eastern Slavonia to be extremely difficult. Still, when, in Paris, Milosevic definitely recognizes Croatia in its internationally recognized borders with his signature, then, not only de facto but also de jure, the issue of eastern Slavonia will become an internal affair of the Republic of Croatia and subject to police intervention if the Serbs show a lack of cooperativeness. Reliable diplomatic sources maintain that Croatia has been asked to be patient for at least six months, and then, if the peaceful reintegration fails, Croatia will be given a green light to implement the reintegration in the way that suits it most at the time, including a military-police intervention. All foreign observers, including the diplomats directly involved in the negotiations, agree on one point—the peaceful reintegration has extremely poor chances of success.

Arkan's Force Might Be Part of Slavonia Police

AU1212193095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Dec 95 p 9

[Article by D.P.: "Tiger Police"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The volunteers of the Serbian Volunteer Guard [SDG] currently in Erdut have been offered new three-month contracts, with the provision that they can be extended, NASA BORBA has found out from "Guard" circles.

According to the new contracts, the members of the Guard would be obliged to renew them if the SDG were to be incorporated into the Croatian-Serb police force as envisaged by "the Erdut-Zagreb agreement" for the Srem-Baranja region. The "Tigers" would be turned into a police force after the decision on the status of the police force, the SDG claims, and Arkan's volunteers would only change the insignia on their uniforms.

Let us remind you that Arkan's men were in the beginning incorporated in the ministry of internal affairs (the Krajina police owns the training center in Erdut) but with time they became a special unit with the Srem-Baranja corps. People we spoke to remember that every volunteer was then given a razor blade with which to remove the insignia of the ministry of internal affairs,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

and a needle and thread to sew on the emblem of the "Tigers."

We have also found out that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs has these days started recruiting men who want to spend some time as policemen in "the blue zone."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Ismail: Bulgarian Army Combat Readiness Heightened

LD1212155695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 12 December (SRNA)—Dzulev Ismail, government spokesman of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], today confirmed that Bulgarian Army movements were recorded along the Bulgarian-Macedonian border and that the level of combat readiness of the Bulgarian Army had been heightened.

Ismail declined to reply to a journalist's question in connection with the theft of 11 Kalashnikovs from a Bulgarian Army munitions depot, which Sofia papers have described as being intended for Albanian separatists in Tetovo, Kicevo, and Debar, and which could threaten Bulgaria's security. [passage omitted]

Delegation Meets Bosnian Ambassador in Ljubljana

AU1312082695 Skopje MIC in English 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In Ljubljana, the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] delegation had a meeting with the ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Slovenia Ugljesha Uzelac, in which it was given first-hand information about all the activities of the Bosnian Government for obtaining investments for the reconstruction of Bosnia. The Bosnian side stressed the need to renew the old contacts between the businessmen from both countries, as well as the appropriate state institutions, as well as the quicker establishment of bilateral relations. At the same time, the Bosnian ambassador to Slovenia emphasized that not one cent has arrived in Bosnia, neither as credit or help to carry out this task, which, on the other hand, gives the Macedonian side more time to get better prepared for the time when that does happen.

It has been agreed for the Macedonian delegation to visit Sarajevo soon, and to discuss this issue with the Bosnian Ministry of Construction Munever Imamovich.

Slovene Partners Sought for B-H Reconstruction

AU1312082995 Skopje MIC in English 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Slovenia are interested in appearing together in the realization of a number of projects for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina [B-H]. This deal comes as a result of the visit to Slovenia by a Macedonian delegation led by the Minister of Urbanization, Construction and Ecology Yorgo Sundovski. The Macedonian delegation met with a number of representatives of the Slovenian authorities and the Slovenian Minister Pavle Ganar, the State Secretary in the Ministry of Economy Vlado Dimovski, as well as representatives of the Slovenian Chamber of Commerce.

As Minister Yorgo Sundovski emphasized, these deals are practically a preparation for the joint appearances of Macedonian construction firms with Slovenian partners in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another outcome is also the agreement for a Protocol for cooperation between the Macedonian and Slovenian Ministry of Economy and Environment.

Zagreb Cancels Meeting With Construction Minister

AU1312082595 Skopje MIC in English 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Immediately after its visit to Slovenia, the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] delegation was supposed to visit Zagreb, for meetings in the Croatian Ministry of Environment and Construction. However, it did not come to this meeting, though it was agreed and long-announced, since it was cancelled by the Croatian side. Otherwise, these talks were supposed to focus not only on arrangements for joint appearance with Macedonian construction companies in building up Bosnia, but destroyed regions and objects in Croatia, as well.

Assembly Deputy Chairman Favors Strong Opposition

AU1312114795 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 10 Dec 95 p 3

[Interview with Assembly Deputy Chairman Tito Petkovski by Aleksandar Soljakovski; place and date not given: "Criticism Is Not Party Pragmatism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tito Petkovski, Assembly deputy chairman of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], is a personality that has been present on the Macedonian political scene for a long time. He has a very important role as one of the founders of the strongest party, the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], in the transition years of the political system. He is "serving" his second mandate as deputy chairman, and now he is also acting as president of the parliamentary group that occupies half of the parliamentary seats. We discussed a number of questions with him concerning the development of democracy, government-parliament relations, responsibility, and political culture.

[Soljakovski] Mr. Petkovski, the first year of the second pluralist mandate of the Macedonian parliament is over. Are you satisfied with what has been accomplished after the victory of the Alliance for Macedonia?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Petkovski] The development of democracy is a very complex question and I am not sure that I can give an appropriate answer without making a thorough analysis. However, if we talk about the accomplishments of the second Macedonian parliament in the last year, I believe that my task will be easier. If we start from the basic goals that were projected in the preelection activities of the Alliance for Macedonia, I think that we can conclude that these goals have been fulfilled. That is, in order to build an independent, sovereign, and social state in transitional conditions it is important to have an efficient parliament that will quickly and legally complete the political and economic system in the country, and a stable government with more independence and less interparty calculating so as to accomplish consistently the program that was presented at the elections. Looking from this angle, expectations have been fulfilled. We have a parliament that sits nearly every week. It has adopted almost all the bills that had been endlessly postponed, some even for three to four years, in the former parliament because of the arrangement of the political forces. On the basis of these bills all sections of the authority started to be constituted. I will mention here only the most important: The Law on Courts and the Law on Local Self-Management, for which a two-thirds majority is needed. We still have to adopt the Law on the Coat of Arms and the Law on State Management, for which we also need a two-thirds majority. Normally, all the bills were adopted upon the government's proposal. The future will show how good these laws are and how much criticism they can endure with the passing of time.

[Soljakovski] Why is there apathy in relation to the quality of the work of the parliament and the government? This apathy has been noticed even among the members of the parties that compose the Alliance for Macedonia.

[Petkovski] This is not only your impression. A large number of the citizens share the same opinion that was formed in the mass media. I believe that a number of the parliament members have the same feeling. The best illustration for this is the nearly regular delays at the beginning of the sessions of the Assembly and the frequent lack of quorum. I believe that this indicates that the parliament members are not motivated. What are the reasons for this? Without pretending to enter into deep analyses, and by the way, I think that this is necessary from a political and a sociological aspect, I will number the reasons that I consider to be the most important. First, I think that it has to do with a feeling of self-sufficiency because of the large majority of the Alliance for Macedonia. The members of the Alliance feel that not a single decision can be at risk because of the large majority, and this disengages some parliament members, they are comfortable, reserved, and they think that even if they are not there, the work will be done. Another reason, which is in direct correlation with the first, is the large concentration of party power in the government. Nearly all the leaders of the parties in the Alliance for Macedonia are sitting in government. The parliament members feel assured because they believe that every government proposal has been considered from the party and political aspect and that there is nothing to add to it. The third reason is that the government has at its disposal a big professional capacity that has to guarantee the competence of the decisions, while the parliament members do not. The fourth and equally important reason is that two-thirds of the parliament members are professionals in different spheres and they give priority to their duties [outside parliament].

Chances for Abusing Power

[Soljakovski] Do you miss an opposition in parliament?

[Petkovski] I often say that the parliamentary democracy in Macedonia is handicapped because it does not have a powerful parliamentary opposition. Or, to be more precise, we have no parliamentary opposition at all. With the union of the members of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and the NDP [People's Democratic Party] a nominal opposition has been formed, which has so far been more engaged in the sphere of interethnic problems. A number of independent and a small number of members from some parties also act as an opposition. The most powerful opposition parties in Macedonia, after their suicidal self-isolation and confinement, became the third factor in the development of parliamentary democracy of a multiparty type in the state. So, they not only marginalized their own political importance, but they also impoverished democracy in Macedonia. This situation has a direct impact on the comfort and ease of the government. The absence of alternative views, programs, ideas, and alternative solutions is another reason why parliament members are not motivated. If there is a struggle of opinions, different views, various ideas, it will give the government and parliament members a direct impetus for finding the best solutions. I generally have in mind a constructive and not a destructive opposition that could degrade all values. I believe that the feeling of some citizens (you mentioned this) that nothing can be changed in the work of the Macedonian Government and the Assembly, and therefore also in the system of parliamentary democracy, is based on these facts.

[Soljakovski] We witnessed a totally atypical act—the opposition withdrew from the election race. In spite of everything, do you think that the 400,000 votes that were given to the SZM [Alliance for Macedonia], which

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

barely represents one-third of the total number of votes, give a sufficient motive to the people who now have the power to behave as they behave?

[Petkovski] This is a complex question and I do not know whether I will hit the point if I tell you that it was been long ago concluded that authority that does not have control is inclined to abuse. This means that the chances for abusing power are always greater if there is not a powerful opposition.

[Soljakovski] Why does the parliament not take control over power in such a situation?

[Petkovski] The Constitution provides the parliament with the basis for taking control over the executive power. It does not only have principles and rights, but it also has the duty to undertake political control and scrutiny in the government and in all the other public services that are responsible to the parliament. Parliament members have several instruments at their disposal for this. First of all, they have the right to ask questions through which they can become directly familiar with the work of the ministers and the government as a whole and to judge their abilities. Parliament members have the right to submit interpellations about the government as a whole and about every government member separately. The parliament has the right to form a polling commission for every sphere and public interest. Finally, the parliament can give a confidence vote to the government.

There Is Not Yet an Official View

[Soljakovski] Why are these parliamentary instruments not used?

[Petkovski] For now, the member's question is the only instrument used for control over the work of the government, although there is a need for the formation of a polling commission. I here refer to the event that took place on 3 October and which shook Macedonia—the assassination attempt against the president of the Republic. A polling commission could put into action the democratic mechanisms in the state with the aim of analyzing possible slipups in the security services and defining possible individual responsibility, by which the integrity, confidence, and credibility of these bodies could be restored.

[Soljakovski] Nevertheless, there is no such initiative yet.

[Petkovski] The reason for this is because matters are still going on in the sphere of police actions. For me, and I believe also for the Macedonian public, it is not yet clear whether the competent public attorney has ordered an investigation and whether the investigative judge has started an investigation on the assassination attempt. What we hear about are the activities of the police and, from time to time, of the investigative judge. So, we still do not have an official view or proposal of the Ministry of the Interior on concrete measures for discovering the instigators, the organizers, and the executors of the assassination attempt against President Gligorov. I here take into consideration the data of the Ministry of the Interior exposed at the news conferences. Some parliament members and some leaders of parliamentary parties have spoken about the need for the formation of such a commission. The parties outside parliament are explicitly asking for this.

[Soljakovski] Has your party, on whose list the minister of the interior is, discussed possible responsibility?

[Petkovski] We have not discussed the possible responsibility of Minister Frckovski, neither within the Central Board of the SDSM, nor within the parliamentary group. As the Macedonian public knows, the prime minister himself decided not to accept Minister Frckovski's offered resignation. So, at this moment, there cannot be any discussions about the political responsibility of the minister. Even if an interpellation on the minister's work is submitted, he cannot be replaced if the prime minister does not ask for it. The parliament can force the prime minister to deprive himself of the services of a minister only if it threatens with a confidence vote on the government. This means that our Constitution has elements of a cabinet government that gives the prime minister great authority. As for the term "offered resignation," there is not such a category in the Constitution, neither is there the term "irrevocable" resignation. Only the prime minister decides on the resignation, while the parliament can only conclude (without discussion) that a minister has resigned.

[Soljakovski] Nevertheless, you have certainly felt the need to do it.

[Soljakovski] You see, it is a fact that there is a need for more complete information about the assassination attempt and it is also indispensable for the Ministry of the Interior to find more time for the completion of the police activities in a more peaceful atmosphere in order to be able to come out with a more appropriate assessment on the assassination attempt. The polling commission that the parliament may form cannot replace the investigative bodies, because it does not have such authority. It has the right to undertake a number of activities and its findings can serve as a basis for charges against the head of the security service. If the members of the Macedonian Assembly and the Macedonian public are not duly presented with such information, the parliament probably has the duty to treat the assassina-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

tion attempt as of top public interest. This question must not be neglected by the members of parliament despite some possible party interests.

Paranoid Situation

[Soljakovski] How normal do you consider the attitude of parliament members who neglect the quality of some draft bills and decide whether to accept them or not only because they were proposed by the SDSM or the LP [Liberal Party]?

[Petkovski] You see, the Alliance of Macedonia is composed of political parties that have close and yet different political programs. The political parties have their own subjectivity and identity. With the formation of the Alliance for Macedonia, we gave greater priority to the national and state, rather than to the narrow party interests. So, we had to give up—all parties separately—a part of our party programs for the sake of these interests. Nevertheless, we remained as separate political factors on the Macedonian political scene. If you remember, the parliamentary group of the Liberal Party was even constrained during the elections of the present Macedonian Government.

[Soljakovski] However, this attitude is too much emphasized and even unpleasant.

[Petkovski] At this moment and at this level of mutual relations among the coalition partners I think that this cannot be avoided. Parliament members of the SDSM, as well as those of the LP and the SP [Socialist Party], first of all, want to demonstrate the advantages of their own political views to the Macedonian public and that is why they often articulate their narrow party interests. However, this is just one side of the coin.

[Soljakovski] Nevertheless, a particular atmosphere has been created that can be even called paranoid—everybody is persecuting everybody. If we say something against the SDSM, the question immediately arises about where it has been launched from. Unfortunately, the same situation is transferred to many other public spheres.

[Petkovski] This is the other side of the coin. We, the members of parliament, or at least a larger number of the members, and I do not exaggerate if I say that it is a common attitude of those who are involved with policy (with some exceptions), lack political culture, and this cannot be obtained only through reading, but a parliamentary tradition is important, and we have been constructing it for only five years. We have rare and few examples of a member of another political party who is only viewed as a political opponent; on the contrary, he is always considered as an enemy.

[Soljakovski] Is this just a question of political culture or is it because of the absence of ideas? Instead of ideas we get gossip.

[Petkovski] Normally, it has to do with pride, because there is either an absence of good ideas or intellectual inadequacy. Sometimes a good idea, initiative, or a proposal is not adopted, only because it comes from a member of another political party. I am sure that after the initial reaction to multiparty parliamentary democracy has been overcome, and after some time of tradition and more fundamental political culture, the political opponent's good ideas will not be treated badly and rejected a priori. We will soon realize that progressive ideas lead to common progress, and this will be valued by the citizens at the next elections. For the building of constructive relations among the coalition partners, and even among all the parties in parliament, the party leaders and other party leaderships have a big role, who, at the moment, are expressing a high level of mistrust.

[Soljakovski] What is the reason for this mistrust?

[Petkovski] I believe that it has to do with wishes and aspirations for domination despite the real political principles that were assessed by the citizens at the elections. Here comes the excessive attention of the parliament members that is turned to their party leaders who dictate the relations among the members of parliament.

Constructive Dissent

[Soljakovski] How much contact does your parliamentary group have with the prime minister?

[Petkovski] The prime minister, unlike other ministers, is nearly the most regular at the sessions of the parliamentary group. I want to believe that the absence of more personal contacts with some parliament members is a result of his big engagement in the government. Nevertheless, I have to say that parliament members make more objections about some ministers who often have less consideration for the needs of parliament members and of their constituencies than for their meetings with the prime minister.

[Soljakovski] At a certain time there were rumors that Tito Petkovski was in conflict with the prime minister and that their contacts were only official.

[Petkovski] You see, I hear many rumors but I do not believe everything I hear. The prime minister and I, as president of the SDSM parliamentary group, have to be in contact for the benefit of the party, the government, and the parliament. This has nothing to do with my own or the prime minister's private life. I do not have any reasons for conflict with the prime minister. I deeply

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

believe that he does not have a rational reason for conflict with me. You know, we are a small country and Skopje is a small town. Even the most ordinary party discussions and opposing views are interpreted as conflicts. It is neither disputable, nor is it a big secret that we have different views on many things in the party and in society. For me this is quite normal. I think that this is also good for the party. Nevertheless, this cannot be the reason or basis for a conflict. I do not understand why a different opinion is called heretic. On the contrary, as responsible people in the party and the state we have the right and duty to stimulate and support a struggle of opinions. To impose egoism and to be closed to criticisms leads to a degradation of the party's ideas simply because the solutions are never final. If we neglect criticism, we will lose our sense of reality, we will become ordinary and obedient people, and this is certainly lethal for the party. I would really like to have as many trends and fresh ideas, different opinions, contested thoughts, and dialogue, in my party as possible, even if it is called a conflict or faction. I deeply believe that this is a characteristic of a large party. The SDSM has the ambition and chances to become such. It has a big creative and inventive potential and if it is placed in the function of the party—then we have good perspectives. Otherwise, we will be suffocated in mediocrity. I believe that criticism must not be experienced as moral disdain and it must not be submitted to day-to-day party pragmatism, because then we risk becoming blind, deaf, and deprived of a sense for reality and challenges. Finally, I believe that criticism is a precondition for the internal party democracy that is an indispensable condition for the development of democracy in the society.

[Soljakovski] What can you say about the commentary that Tito Petkovski is easygoing because he is in control of at least one-half of the parliamentary group?

[Petkovski] I do not know what you mean when you say "control." I am president of the SDSM parliamentary group and I am at its head. It would be a shame for me and for the party if I did not have authority among these members. I do not have a high party position so as to control parliament members. I use arguments, sometimes long-lasting polemics, to come to the best solutions at the parliamentary group sessions so as to be able to defend them in the best way at the plenary sessions of the Macedonian Assembly. The moment I realize that I am not supported by the majority in the parliamentary group, I will stop acting as its president. It is not my problem whether somebody speculates on this or not.

Commentary Views 'Apathy' in By-Elections

AU1212134995 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 8 Dec 95 pp 21-22

[Commentary by Sinisa Stankovic: "Debutantes, Recidivists, and Optimists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Midnight on 3 December ended the candidate selection procedure for the parliamentary by-elections in Constituency 114, which encompasses five local communities in the Skopje Commune "Center." At the end of this term, the list of candidates for the vacant parliamentary seat (following the death of Kiro Popovski, Assembly deputy chairman and president of the Socialist Party) was completed with 11 names from nine political parties (two of them are coalition representatives) and two independent candidates: Nevaip Ramadani from the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP], Baftin Dzemail from the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [PDPA], Nikola Lazarevski from the Democratic Party of Macedonia [DPM], Amdi Bajram from the Party for Full Emancipation of Romanies [PCER], Vladimir Golubovski from the VMRO-DP [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Democratic Party], Nijazi Samet from the Democratic Party of Turks [DPT], Vasil Drvosanov from the Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] coalition, Cvetko Trifunovski from the MAAK [All-Macedonian Action]—Conservative Party, Krste Janikoski from the Workers Party in a coalition with the VMRO-MNDS [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Macedonian National Democratic Alliance] and the Macedonian National Party, and independent candidates Todor Petrov and Ljupco Lazarevski.

On 27 December, approximately 13,500 voters who are on the updated list (which has been made public) will cast their votes at 17 polling stations. Although last year's elections sparked a great interest in the voters (over 70 percent of the 11,667 registered voters went to the elections), the expectations are not the same this time. It is evident that the by-elections are not a big challenge for the political parties, and, therefore, we cannot expect the voters to "run" for their election right. Moreover, filling in the vacant seat will not have a big influence on Macedonia's political map. The parliament's activity in the last year (unanimous and urgent adoption of government proposals and its submitting role in relation to the executive power) has weakened public interest in its work. This can be seen in the articles in the mass media on the by-elections and on the public addresses by party leaders and their candidates before the elections. There are seven candidates less than in November 1994, there is a lack of tension, and even

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the "accompanying activities," like confrontations and exposing the opponents' "dirty laundry," can hardly be expected. (Even the last television address by potential parliament members did not present many arguments for the serious political approach of the candidates).

There are several reasons for this. The abstinence of the two largest opposition parties, the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party, which cannot boast about playing the role of reformer and initiator of changes after last year's elections (although not lately) make this by-election quite uninteresting. It is true that it would not sound serious if these two parties were to go to the elections after boycotting last year's elections, but the question of how much damage their action caused the fragile Macedonian democracy is still open. The other opponents will hardly have enough forces to confer with it seriously.

There is simply an atmosphere of "dormant" confrontation between the representative of the ruling parties and the representatives of the other parties in parliament (let us not mention the parties outside parliament), which are trying to "run away" from the outsider's role with more or less success. This is exactly why, after the disarrayed atmosphere that was created within the Alliance for Macedonia after the attempted assassination against President Gligorov, the main subject of public interest was whether the coalition would come forward with a common candidate and who that might be, considering the struggle for party and parliamentary positions within the Socialist Party itself. After the Liberals and the Social Democrats had paid respect to the former coalition, it became clear that the loose coalition would be represented by a socialist. Although there had been other unofficial announcements (Iljo Gajtanovski, Vladimir Voinovski, Vladimir Bogoevski, Dr. Jovan Lazarev, and the wife of deceased Kiro Popovski, Dr.Zlatka Popovska) the candidate of the Alliance for Macedonia coalition will be Dr. Vasil Drvosanov, who has not been very exposed to policy so far and has big chances to become a member of parliament. The unfulfilled love between the Alliance for Macedonia and the PCER (perhaps because of the unofficial precondition of the president of the PCER Faik Abdi to become nothing less than Assembly deputy chairman) made businessman Amdi Bajram, who came in second with 762 votes at last year's elections and who will run on the card of the great percentage of the Roma population in this constituency, the main competitor to Drvosanov. The competitors in last year's elections will also join the race, like Nijazi Samet from the DPT [Democratic Party of Turks], who received 119 votes, and independent candidate Ljupco Lazarevski, who received only 60 votes. It is certainly impossible to bypass Vladimir Golubovski from the VMRO-DP, who has finally "come back" from Ohrid and Bitola to reexamine his popularity in Skopje, or the Albanian candidates Nevaip Ramadani and Baftin Dzemail, whose showdown will be an indicator for the present ratings of the PDP and the PDPA in Skopje, or the leader of the Workers Party, Krste Jankoski, (who is in an odd coalition with the VMRO-MNDS and the Macedonian National Party, although he explained that he has been chosen because he is an "honest and uncompromised person who will represent the programs of the three parties in the best way").

[Besides Jankoski, who has already announced that if he enters parliament, he will be the "creator of new ideas who plans to confront many taboo subjects," there is Todor Petrov (as an independent candidate, he is returning to political home grounds), president of the World Macedonian Congress and known for presenting the most amendments in the previous parliament. If he enters parliament, he might influence a change in the "idyllic" atmosphere at the sessions. (On the other hand, Petrov's approach is interesting. He was a strong oppositioner, but he has decided to be a candidate again. Judging by the short time in which he gathered 100 signatures, we can conclude that he made this decision at the last minute.)

The by-elections will be a relevant indicator of whether and how correct the assessments are that the degree of apathy and demotivation in politics is too high and disproportionate to the optimism of the politicians who pretend to be people's representatives.

Government Announces Revisions to Customs Tariffs

AU1312082895 Skopje MIC in English 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At yesterday's session, the Macedonian Government reviewed and determined the draft-law on customs tariffs, which makes a complete revision of the existing tariff, in terms of the nomenclature analysis, and the level of customs rates. In addition, the newest changes to the convention on harmonized system, and the combined tariff of the EU are also coordinated. The text of the law abolishes all tariff rates that were used to protect the economy of the former YU republics, as well as the all the positions that did not have an entrance or exit to the customs region of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], in the last couple of years, the Information Secretariat announced.

The text of the law, as the Government concluded, is based on the European orientation with the use of world

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

experiences, and it also includes a number of valid requests of the Macedonian producers. The Government also determined the proposal for the adoption of a law on energetics, since the activities in this field were not defined very well in the existing one, a number of organizational forms for energy system existed in practice, and the unequal treatment of certain types of energy was present as well.

Furthermore, the Government accepted the draft-law on tax for temporary residence, according to which the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia and foreign citizens, provided they use the services for spending the night in accommodating objects, registered for putting up guests over night, outside their permanent residence, will have to pay 20 denars per day, with the exception of children, teenagers, students and other persons who are exempt from paying this tax, according to certain articles of this law. By accepting this text of the law, which was regulated with the existing law on public utilities taxes until now, the funds gathered on this basis will be entirely in the function of the economic activities, whose basic line of work is tourism.

'Massive' Brain Drain 'Very Serious Problem'

AU1312082795 Skopje MIC in English 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The massive outflow of brains and work potential is an alarming situation for any country, which can bring into question the overall social development as well. In Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], this outflow varied in intensity at times, but it seems it is becoming quite alarming these last couple of years. The line of work-capable and highly educated young people who travel literally every day, regretfully, only in one direction, is only becoming longer every day. Our personnel, mainly from the technical sciences, and not only these, triggered by the slow progress of technology and everything that goes with it, but mainly the standard and impossibility to find jobs, are leaving the country as a final product, to countries that have not spent a cent for their education and training. And, the price for such education and the creation of personnel, for any country, including ours, is very high. According to some calculations, the social costs for education, for instance, of an engineer, add up to US$ 10,000, for a Doctor of Sciences, even twice as much.

In Macedonia's case, several more massive waves of emigration and brain outflow have been noticed. Usually, they were linked with crisis situations and greater economic difficulty. The sociologists and demographers point out that one of the heaviest effects is overseas emigration. It's permanent. According to some realizations, some 600,000 Macedonians, if not more, have left to overseas countries, permanently, and some 60,000 have been swallowed, temporarily, by the European "pool." There are even 34 church communities in the overseas countries, organized in two eparchies, which are dedicated to helping the Macedonian emigrants adapt to their new environment and living conditions.

The last and most massive emigration was manifested in the period prior to the break up of the former federation. With certain oscillations, that can be felt even today. A river of young people are moving out of our country, ranging from an age of 18 to 27 year. At the moment, according to all data, the most attractive and "promised land" for the young brains, especially those from the technical sciences, is New Zealand. Estimates say that up to 3,000 families move to this country every year, with one child, in average, which forms a final figure of some 9,000 people.

Some indicators say that up to 30 agencies in our country and abroad are arranging such emigrations, charging a provision of up to 2-3,000 German marks. The signals, practically, point to the conclusion that the embassies of New Zealand in Vienna and Sofia are invaded by Macedonian citizens, interested in finding jobs in these far-away places. Forms for New Zealand are circulating in the student dormitories and restaurants literally every day. Triggered by the alarm which has been at red alert for quite some time already, academic Dr. Jordan Pop Jordanov recently formed a special team to examine the reasons for this massive outflow of young experts. Concluding quite bitterly that we are giving the world nuclear engineers, while the world is giving us nuclear waste, Dr. Pop Jordanov surveyed some students from the technical faculties about their future plans.

In effect, Pop Jordanov asked the students to answer the following questions: Do you intend to move to some foreign country after completing your studies, what are the reasons for that, and what does the state have to do to keep you here? The results, stated quite simply, were quite disastrous. Namely, some 48% of the students polled are thinking about leaving the country, and 20% have already made such a decision. 37% of the students explained their decision with economic, social and cultural reasons. Even 43% of the students polled asked the state, if it wants to keep them, to improve their living standard and to financially and morally valorize the price of their profession. As an illustration, an engineer is paid an average of 4,500 German marks in New Zealand. All these realizations point out that Macedonia is faced with a very serious problem, and that the intensive outflow of personnel could have devastating effects on its overall development. Therefore, it is becoming necessary to face and deal with this situation

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

as soon as possible. It is also worth considering the idea of taking into account the experiences of other countries, which have already given certain effects. The example of Great Britain probably already says a lot about the way to go about stopping this outflow of personnel. Here, namely, up to million pounds are put aside every year, to stimulate the young people to put their knowledge exclusively at the disposal of their country. Similar programs are applied in many other countries, all with the purpose to keep the wealth of the scientific potential. Such measures are necessary, as it seems, in our country, as well.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Troops in Bosnia Not Receiving War Benefits

WS1312093995 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 11 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by Michal Zon: "Where Is the Money for the Polish Soldiers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Polish troops have been a part of the UN peace mission in former Yugoslavia for several years now. They are stationed in the war zone and are entitled to a special benefit of $3 for each day of service. Not everyone, however, is getting that money.*

In a statement issued in 1993, the foreign minister acknowledged a region in Croatia (Kraijna) as a war zone. Benefits were thus paid out to the Polish soldiers.

In early 1994, the peacekeeping forces were reorganized and, as a result, the Polish troops were deployed to a different area.

The Poles are currently stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A new group of "red berets" from Poland will be sent there shortly. The soldiers are not receiving the money they are entitled to.

The civil rights spokesman requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the area where the Polish troops are operating as a war zone. Thus far the ministry has remained silent.

UN funds earmarked for the benefits are not leaving Poland. Employees of the Civil Rights Spokesman's Office have been trying to find out where exactly is the money that is to be paid out to soldiers. Thus far they have been unable to find out.

Communique on Delaying NATO Expansion Viewed

WS1212143195 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 8-10 Dec 95 p 4

[Commentary by Maksymilian Berezowski: "NATO Expansion: Who Is Widening the Distance?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It was a bad thing that the ministerial NATO Council postponed by an entire year the date of making more specific decisions regarding admission of new members to the organization. Even though the Brussels communique reads that the year 1996 will see "intensive consultations" with the countries involved and implementation of the "second stage" of this process, it also tells these countries that they should not delude themselves: "Participation in this stage will mean that the partners involved will be invited to talks on the expansion of NATO."*

How does the "second stage" differ from the first one, then? What is the meaning of the declaration that the purpose of these "consultations" is only to make it easier to take "further steps" next December, instead of leading to those steps directly?

The language of the communique seems to suggest that we are about to enter another period of waiting for talks on talks; the goal that is to be achieved was not specified. It may suggest something else—that even though NATO prepared many documents, expansion is kind of vague, enveloped in a general, noncommittal, polite message. Of course, no reasonable person expected that in December 1995 the Atlantic ministers would open the door to NATO and specify all the details right now. However, during the past year we have heard many declarations from them; these declarations led us to expect that next year would provide answers to the most fundamental questions: "who" and "when," that is, when and which countries can hope to start serious negotiations leading to membership in NATO. Naturally, one reservation should be made: the negotiations should not be too fast.

However, the communique did not clarify matters that much. It did not specify anything. "We will learn that in 1997," said Javier Solana, new secretary general of the alliance.

In such a situation, Peter Rodman, an American politician and a former high-ranking official in the administrations of four Republican presidents, says that "President Clinton and his aides reportedly assured Moscow secretly that (...) in the foreseeable future NATO would not expand." Rodman quotes both Russian and American "authoritative sources" and promises that he will further investigate the issue. What impression can we get?

U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher called his revelations "absolute nonsense." One is tempted to accept this denial without any reservations, because what Rodman said sounded really bad.

It is a well-known fact that Russia is exerting all kinds of pressure on NATO not to expand. This is deplorable, but not surprising. What is important, however, is the stance of the alliance, which has itself decided to admit new members and included this decision in its strategy. It should not widen the distance. On the contrary: we should rather expect increasingly more preparations for NATO expansion. There is no doubt that such consistency also determines NATO's credibility in the world—the mission in Bosnia alone will not guarantee it.

Only if it implements its decisions in time can the alliance play a role that would correspond to its potential.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland's determination to join NATO is well known and constant.

It was confirmed by the Polish prime minister when he announced participation of the Polish military contingent in the NATO mission in Bosnia. This determination is also based on the conviction that the stability of Europe and the interests of the West require Poland's participation in its structures.

Walesa To Reveal Oligarchy's Foreign Connections

WS1312120695 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "We Will Argue in the Sejm"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] A few minutes before the end of the meeting [with members of the Confederation for an Independent Poland on 12 December], Walesa made a startling statement: "This is top secret. It is dynamite. I have a lot of proof that our postcommunist oligarchy has international connections. We are still verifying the documents." Reporters asked him what he meant by that, but Walesa did not reply. Marek Karpinski, his spokesman, said only that an answer will be given "in due time."

Danuta Waniek Appointed Head of Chancellery

WS1212145795 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by "AN": "Head of the Chancellery"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president-elect has appointed Danuta Waniek, a deputy of the Democratic Left Alliance and chief of his campaign staff, to head his Chancellery after he is sworn into office on 23 December. Waniek said that the president-elect will move to the Presidential Palace immediately after taking his oath. She hopes that talks with the head of Lech Walesa's Chancellery Stanislaw Iwanicki on taking over the office will take place in an amiable atmosphere. Waniek is 49. She studied law and political sciences in Warsaw and Vienna. She worked at the Institute of the Fundamental Problems of Marxism and Leninism at the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] and at the Academy of Social Sciences. She is currently employed at the Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences. She joined the PZPR in 1967. She is a member of the National Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, a leader of the Parliamentary Group of Women, and former deputy defense minister. She is divorced, has two sons, and has a house in Warsaw.

Opposition on Boycotting Kwasniewski Inauguration

WS1312114895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Dec 95 p 2

[Article by "POZ, SAR": "For the SLD President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Kwasniewski's swearing-in ceremony may cause emotions to run high. Members of the opposition may stage demonstrations and a boycott.*

The Republican League—made up of former and current members of the Independent Association of Students—will demonstrate in front of the parliament building. "Our main demand will be to judge the president who is a liar," says Chairman Mariusz Kaminski. The party is also to shout in protest to what has come to be known as the "red web."

Aleksander Kwasniewski will take his oath in front of the National Assembly (the Sejm and Senat). The Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] is planning to boycott the inauguration. It is appealing to the entire opposition to do the same.

Jerzy Gwizdz, (deputy, chairman of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms): "I do not think I could attend, not that I dislike Kwasniewski. Naturally, I have to respect the Supreme Court's verdict. Kwasniewski, however, did not show respect for the Supreme Court—he did not take the trouble of replying to the inquiry about his education even in writing.

"I could attend if all the charges were cleared; if Kwasniewski showed remorse and apologized to the nation he cheated."

Zbigniew Romaszewski, (Solidarity senator): "We will take advantage of the fact that 23 December is right before Christmas Eve. We will not consider that a working day. Seriously speaking, however, it is difficult to stay calm when you hear someone who cheated his way into the presidential office swear before the nation that he will observe the law."

Tomasz Nalecz, (Union of Labor [UP] deputy): "It is very sad that the presidential elections were accompanied by incidents like the one with Kwasniewski's education. The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the elections were valid. Out of respect for democracy and law, we have to turn up at the National Assembly session.

"As for my colleagues from the KPN, I would like to remind them of the terse words Marshall Pilsudski [prewar head of state] spoke about the rightist deputies who had boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of President

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of copyright owners.

Narutowicz. The situation is not identical, but respect for the presidential office should remain unchanged.

"Today, we can either come to terms with the result of the elections (remembering the imperfect way in which they were carried out), or continue to sling mud at each other. I am for the former because the latter leads to chaos and tarnishes Poland's international image.

"Before the second round of elections, the UP National Council declared its 'lack of enthusiasm' for any of the two candidates, yet it also stated that it would cooperate with the president—regardless of who he is—within the framework of the Constitution.

"Moreover, the problem of Kwasniewski has been settled by the highest court of all—the voters. They decided Kwasniewski deserves to be president."

UW [Freedom Union] politicians do not want to issue any official statement before they make a decision. We have learned from unofficial sources that the right wing of the union (Jan Rokita, Bronislaw Komorowski, Zdobyslaw Milewski) as well as several centrists will not be present. The unionists doubt that the party club will decide to boycott the swearing-in ceremony en masse.

Poll Shows Kwasniewski Would Win Elections Again

WS1212135395 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 11 Dec 95 p 7

[Article by Renata Wrobel: "Social Research Laboratory for RZECZPOSPOLITA: Giving Untrue Information Has Not Hurt Kwasniewski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *One week after the second round of the presidential elections, we asked the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] to ask Poles how they would have voted given the opportunity of changing their decision of 19 November. The poll showed that Aleksander Kwasniewski still would have greater chances of winning.*

At the time the poll was carried out, it was already known that several hundred thousand protests had been filed with the Supreme Court, the issue of the newly elected president's education was being hotly debated, and the fact that he had provided untrue information was being discussed. No one knew at the time, however, what the Supreme Court's ruling would be: whether it would consider the protests legitimate and, if so, how many and which ones and whether it would order that the elections be repeated.

Had We Voted Once Again

Had those who voted on 19 November had another opportunity to vote, the balance would have slightly tipped in Aleksander Kwasniewski's favor once again. Out of the total number of respondents who voted in the second round, 46 percent would have voted for Kwasniewski, 42 percent for Walesa, 3 percent would have crossed out the names of both, 6 percent would not have voted at all, and 3 percent were unable to say what they would have done.

The majority of those polled would have voted just as they had in the second round. As many as 90 percent of Kwasniewski's supporters would have voted for him once again (5 percent would not have voted at all). Walesa could have counted on 86 percent of his supporters from the second round (7 percent would not go to vote). Half of those who crossed out the names of both candidates would have done the same thing again (the rest would have either not voted or avoided an answer, and some would have supported Lech Walesa).

Although turnout in the second round was high, nearly one in three Poles did not vote. Their votes could have considerably changed the final result, but, as the poll shows, only theoretically. Practically, almost one-half of those who did not vote on 19 November (48 percent) would have remained either unwilling or unable to take part in the elections. Votes cast by the rest would have rather strengthened Aleksander Kwasniewski's lead. A readiness to support the leftist candidate was declared by 7 percent of those who stayed home on 19 November, but they would be willing to turn up at the ballot box now. Lech Walesa could count on one in five votes (21 percent) within this group.

One important proviso has to be made: Those polled were asked to say how they would have behaved in a completely fictitious situation—not only because it was still unknown at the time what the verdict of the Supreme Court would be, but because the ruling that the elections were invalid would not imply another duel between Kwasniewski and Walesa. The whole voting procedure would have to be repeated, from collecting signatures of support and fielding candidates, to holding a possible second round in which the two contenders could be, after all, altogether different.

Charges Undeniable, but No Impact?

It is worth remembering the results of a poll on the impact of charges brought forth in the course of the presidential elections carried earlier by RZECZPOSPOLITA. Voters declared that charges brought against rivals by Aleksander Kwasniewski and Lech Walesa and their campaign staffs would have no influence on how they

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

voted. After the charges had been raised, 79 percent of those polled did not change their minds. More than half, however, expected that all questions would be answered.

If you had the opportunity to vote one more time, for whom would you vote?

	Percent
I would vote for Kwasniewski	46
I would vote for Walesa	42
I would cross out both names	3
I would not vote	6
Difficult to say	3

* * *

The poll was carried out by PBS at the request of RZECZPOSPOLITA between 26 and 29 November 1995 on a representative sample group of 1,060 adult Poles.

Oleksy on New Appointments, Relations in Coalition

WS1212121095 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 11 Dec 95 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy by Ewa Rosolak and Dariusz Szymczycha; place and date not given: "I Will Not Substitute for the Foreign Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [TRYBUNA] Mr. Prime Minister, restoration of constitutional order manifests itself in the fact that the prime minister is appointing his candidates to all ministerial offices and that there is one, not two governments, within the government. Does this process of constitutional order restoration have to be so painful?

[Oleksy] This is nothing extraordinary, except that the period in which the obvious was not respected, will be over. It is a good thing that the Ministries of National Defense [MON], Internal Affairs [MSW], and Foreign Affairs [MSZ] will not have a special status. It is true that they are special in a way, because all the three ministries are linked to the security and image of the state. However, they are not so special that they should be completely subordinated to the head of state, especially since the Constitution does not make such a distinction.

Currently we are simply removing what is abnormal.

[TRYBUNA] While this process is under way, the head of the Polish government is being compared to the hero of a Woody Allen film. Is this normal?

[Oleksy] This, alas, is normal for... GAZETA WYBORCZA. It was not the first time that this daily published an article which was subordinated to the desire to make a final, exclusively correct judgment.

I received very negatively the article by Mr. Krzemien, carried in GAZETA WYBORCZA, on the prospects for Polish foreign policy. This was not only because the author took advantage of unjustified guesses as well as false information, but also because I detected overtones of hatred toward me as prime minister in the article.

[TRYBUNA] This means that you will not be prime minister and foreign affairs minister at the same time?

[Oleksy] I never had such an intention.

[TRYBUNA] Who will head the MSZ, Professor Geremek?

[Oleksy] It will certainly be a person whose qualifications and experience will guarantee proper the functioning of this ministry and the coordination of Polish foreign policy.

It is too early to reveal any names. There is still too much fighting and anger in Poland. The evaluations of those whom one really wants to burden with duties should not be exposed to fierce attacks too early.

[TRYBUNA] Over the last few years, the office of the MSZ head has been assumed by professors. Is this tradition going to be maintained?

[Oleksy] That cannot be ruled out.

[TRYBUNA] Who will be the new MSZ head? Will it be a person closer to the concept favored by the president-elect, who is an advocate of a candidate from outside the coalition, or will it be a person closer to your concept?

[Oleksy] There are no differences between the views of the president-elect and mine. I only objected to suggestions that these ministries should be controlled by the opposition. I believe that it would be quite bizarre if, in a government where the coalition has a clear majority, some of the portfolios were taken over by the opposition. I am an advocate of filling these ministerial posts with people who are not directly subordinated to the coalition parties. The only question is the following: How far should we reach and what "gestures" should we make, gestures the importance of which I do not underestimate. This is because I believe that either one has a good platform and governs efficiently, which the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

people can see, or one does not have this and then "gestures" will not help much.

I assume, however, that in our fledgling democracy, since there are certain fierce divisions, the "philosophy of gestures" is justified. Thus, if I pursued such a policy, I would try to find people who are experts, possibly well-known professionals. However, this does not mean that these should be people who are alien to the government or who do not share the opinions of the coalition and the government.

[TRYBUNA] Do you not fear the reaction of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, where you are generally seen as the future chairman? Perhaps the declaration that the ministries which are important from the point of view of state security may be taken over by politicians from outside the party will trigger criticism and aversion?

[Oleksy] Perhaps. However, I myself cannot say yet how far the people appointed to these posts might be from the coalition. Let me say again that this is one way of looking at making these ministerial appointments, one which will open us up to these circles, which are still complaining and sensing some "apocalyptic" threats on the part of the governing coalition. Perhaps certain symbols and gestures might help them take a calmer look at the future and show greater readiness for dialog and cooperation. Nothing should be neglected here! I am not ignoring the opinion of my party or of my coalition partners from the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. I will certainly hold consultations and try to win the coalition—as well as the president—over to my concept. The most important thing to me is to ensure that the cabinet is a uniform government, one over which the prime minister has full control, a government which implements the left-of-center platform of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and the PSL. If the new ministers support such a platform and implement it along with the entire Council of Ministers, we will be able to attach less importance to the issue of their party membership.

[TRYBUNA] Does this mean that now the government will speak as one and that we will not see surprises such as the independent idea of purchasing the "Alpha-Jet" planes, which was put forward by the national defense minister?

[Oleksy] I hope that we will not see such unpleasant surprises in the future. I also expect that the government will speak as one because if it does not do that, it simply loses in the eyes of the people. I would like to add here that speaking as one does not mean that ministers must not differ from each other or that during cabinet sessions they are not allowed to voice different opinions, criticize, or evaluate each other. What I want is something else: When the government makes a decision, this decision should be binding on everyone.

[TRYBUNA] How did you manage to ease the tension between Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko and Minister Miller?

[Oleksy] This is my secret. However, this situation may not last for ever. After all, the issue on which both ministers differed was not their personal aspirations, but an extremely difficult problem of social insurance—a matter which is exceptionally complex and which triggers a lot of controversy. There are really no wonderful remedies. Disputes are necessary in order to obtain solutions that are optimal in a given situation.

[TRYBUNA] Mr. Prime Minister, what is the procedure in selecting the successors of the ministers: Bartoszewski, Milczanowski, and Okonski?

[Oleksy] The procedure is simple. The prime minister submits a constitutional motion to the president, and the president signs the nomination. Before submitting such a motion, the prime minister should hold consultations on appointments to these three ministries, and this actually happens. Now, since we have a coalition government, it is understandable that I feel obligated to consult with both the PSL and SLD.

However, I want to reiterate that the most important thing to me is efficient administration and exertion of my influence on the functioning of MON, MSW, and MSZ, something which we have not seen so far. We did observe a certain balance and elegance in the contacts, but I never deluded myself that I had any control over these ministries. This state of affairs was here before I became prime minister; my reason told me to look upon it as a given and to deal with issues that were more important to the state. Today I want and have to be responsible for all the work of the government. I have the sense of responsibility and I am aware of my constitutional supervision and coordination of the work of all ministers. After all, the government's work is assessed as a whole; people do not assess individual ministries.

I assume that the new ministers will be appointed not as a result of disputes within the coalition and the parties, but as a result of selection of competent and professional people.

[TRYBUNA] The position of the foreign affairs minister will not be as special as it has been so far?

[Oleksy] It will be, if the minister is able to achieve it. After all, this special position stemmed from the exceptional prestige which the subsequent ministers

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

enjoyed. There is no obstacle in the way of the new foreign affairs minister to gain as much prestige for himself as his predecessors did. However, this depends on him—on his ability to move about in the world and to represent Poland's interests.

[TRYBUNA] One can expect that departure of these three ministers will also trigger personnel changes in the ministries headed by them. This is particularly clear in the MSW...

[Oleksy] Not only there. As a rule, a new minister has the right to submit new candidacies and to employ people with whom he will want to share the responsibility for the ministry. However, I do not predict a revolution...

[TRYBUNA] There will be no personnel purge?

[Oleksy] No purge is envisioned. The atmosphere of waiting for sensations is not justified.

[TRYBUNA] Since you are not an advocate of making concessions toward the opposition, do you not fear it will wage a war?

[Oleksy] You cannot build relations with the opposition by bowing before it although some members of the opposition like that. I have always been open to cooperation with the opposition, yet all this time—first as Sejm speaker and now as prime minister—I see that all proposals of cooperation are being rejected in areas where political rivalry should not overshadow the important issues at hand. The opposition in Poland keeps on clinging to an ethos of basing its entire existence and image on a fight with the governing coalition. Entering cooperation and dialogue is up to the opposition, not the coalition. I hope I will see signals of the opposition's willingness to cooperate. The government and the coalition have already declared theirs.

The question is whether the opposition is capable of changing its policy and—instead of confronting and fighting the governing coalition—is willing to express its readiness to cooperate as long as it would not be detrimental to the identity of the particular groups it is made up of.

[TRYBUNA] Chairman of the Freedom Union Leszek Balcerowicz has recently said there are topics on which agreement is possible. Which topics do you think these might be?

[Oleksy] There are plenty. The Constitution, for example, requires all the political group to cooperate. A further topic is the reform of the social security, health care and health insurance systems. No government would attempt to introduce such reforms alone, without at least minimal agreement with the opposition. Privatization and mass enfranchisement also call for consolidating efforts. They still require a debate between the particular groups. The various myths and simplifications in circulation should be clarified, enhancing widespread understanding of such important issues as privatization.

Another huge issue that cannot be solved "single-handedly" and only by a peasant party is restructuring the farming sector and agriculture.

Also there are state-church relations, to which the government and the coalition do not have exclusive rights. This is an area which requires a wide perspective and final defining so that these relations stop giving incessant rise to unnecessary emotions.

We also have to join forces on the issue of integrating Poland with the EU and NATO. I believe we have already agreed there is no alternative but to join the Euroatlantic structures. Yet agreement is not enough. We have to develop plans and integration strategies jointly, above party divisions. We have to take advantage of opportunities, avoid risks, and meet challenges. The ultimate priority of NATO and EU membership should be an incentive for change, and not merely an impulse for waiting passively. Poland currently faces the challenge of making a collective effort at an effective integration process.

[TRYBUNA] As prime minister of the Polish government, do you feel you have the support of the PSL?

[Oleksy] Yes. I feel a bond with my PSL colleagues. The PSL has been preoccupied with its own problems for some time now. I expect the PSL will begin to play a more active role in the coalition. Yet the coalition is functioning properly, the leaders meet on a regular basis; we also have established a team of experts which identifies the convergent points in our platforms on the basis of which the coalition partners cooperate. That team also will analyze the distinct differences in the SLD and PSL platforms. I do not think it lies in the interests of a coalition made up of two parties to eliminate differences. On the contrary, it is necessary to recognize those differences and discuss them openly. There is nothing unusual about that. There also is no reason why differences in the platforms of two different and autonomous parties with separate electorates and an established position on the Polish political scene should be hidden or treated as disgraceful, as tearing the coalition apart. Hitherto cooperation between the PSL and SLD has been mature and fruitful, and the identities of both partners have remained intact.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[TRYBUNA] Will the upcoming Sejm vote on the concordat be a destabilizing factor for the government coalition?

[Oleksy] It will not. The views of the coalition partners have long since been known. The majority of the PSL is for an unconditional ratification of the concordat, while the majority of the SLD is against it because of its questions and doubts.

[TRYBUNA] Will the government be surprised if the Sejm does decide it is necessary to pass the concordat?

[Oleksy] No. The government plays no active part here. The Sejm only defines certain goals for the government. We will fulfill them as recommended. I share some of the criticisms of the concordat. I do not, however, think that the issue of the concordat should remain unsolved for a longer period of time. From the moment it became clear that the church is not ready to renegotiate the concordat, we should have settled the issue by a vote. This has been going on for two years now and emotions are pent up. The concordat has divided the nation. It began having an influence on state-church relations. I think it is high time to finally solve the matter.

[TRYBUNA] Thank you for the interview.

Right-Wing Bloc Formation Chances Viewed

WS1212134595 Poznan WPROST in Polish
10 Dec 95 pp 20-21

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur and Eryk Mistewicz: "Will Opposition Parties Wait a Few Dozen Years for a Victory? An Opposition of Self-Annihilation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Today it is impossible to build the 'L' sign with the 'pieces' that are laying in disarray in front of Kwasniewski. Politicians who are on our side of the political scene are not abreast of the changes that are taking place on the political scene. They should move away from the limelight," says Freedom Union [UW] Deputy Jan Rulewski. Unless the opposition finds a place for itself within the next few months, it will not be able to regain power for at least several years. The steps which have been taken so far indicate that the opposition groups will continue to annihilate themselves for a long time, until they learn how to fight efficiently for power.*

For the time being Solidarity [S] feels rejuvenated; it is soaring high in public opinion polls which assess the public support for the various parties. This strengthens the leadership position of Marian Krzaklewski in the union; Krzaklewski endorsed the incumbent president and now he can count on cooperation with Lech Walesa. The president is setting up his institute, which may give rise to a joint election bloc of a considerable part of the opposition. He also has decided to be the "moral patron" of the Bloc for Poland [BdP], which is being formed primarily by the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR]. The party's leader, Jerzy Gwizdz, believes that within the BdP there is enough room for all the forces which backed Walesa before the second round of the elections. However, BBWR Spokesman Leszek Zielinski excludes the UW from the BdP; he believes that the party is too far on the left. The right wing does not know what it is doing?

Well, it does not. The force of S and popularity of Walesa determine the activities of small right-wing parties. Conservative Party [PK] Chairman Aleksander Hall proposes reestablishing the great camp of forces which come from the former "S" movement, including the UW and supporters of Jan Olszewski.

"There will be no great anticommunist camp headed by Lech Walesa, nor will there be a party with Aleksander Hall, Leszek Balcerowicz, and Zygmunt Wrzodak," argues UW Deputy Andrzej Potocki.

Another idea has been proposed by Conservative Coalition leader Kazimierz Michal Ujazdowski. He excludes the UW from the big camp. "The UW has not proved itself in the role of the parliamentary opposition," claims Ujazdowski, whose party failed to meet the 5-percent requirement in the [parliamentary] elections. Ujazdowski looks at UW with disgust, but—just like Hall—he would gladly take advantage of the force of the trade union structures, even though some time ago he was highly critical of the S syndicalism. Now the conservatives are waiting to see whether Marian Krzaklewski wants to pat them on the back.

Jan Olszewski is establishing a separate movement. The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROB] will be a national-radical formation in the ideological sphere and leftist-populist in the area of the economy. The slogans of defending religion, decommunization, file-checking, and "mass enfranchisement" guarantee ROB a faithful electorate which may give it a chance to set up a parliamentary circle in the future. Its only chance to gain more supporters might come as a result of an acute economic crisis and as a consequence of stimulating the mood of social dissatisfaction. Polarization of the political scene into two camps, as proposed by Hall and Ujazdowski, would be favorable to the radicalism advocated by Olszewski's supporters. Fear of this radicalism, in turn, would consolidate the electorate of SLD, whereas groups of the moderate right wing and left wing would have to fight even to get to the parliament. This is why the UW and the Union of Labor [UP] oppose such polarization.

The UW is trying to achieve its goal by making so-called issue-related agreements, that is, by seeking pos-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

sibilities of cooperation not only with the Republicans, the PK, or the One Hundred Movement, all of which are relatively close to the UW, but also with the UP and the Confederation for an Independent Poland. UP Chairman Ryszard Bugaj goes further, suggesting that it is possible to form a new governing coalition consisting of the UP, UW, and PSL. In addition, politicians seem to ignore the fact that voters might not accept an alliance formed by "extreme leftists," "wild liberals," and "conservative peasants." Opposition leaders find it easier to communicate with one another than with their own voters.

This does not mean that they communicate with one another very well. The UP made the decision last Saturday to expel Wojciech Lamentowicz, who—against the stand taken by the party—endorsed Aleksander Kwasniewski before the second round of the elections, which may result in a rebellion among some of the lower-ranking party members, who are in favor of abandoning the role of "eternal opposition." In addition, within the UP there are increasingly clear divisions into those who come from the former opposition camp and those who were activists of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. This puts into question Ryszard Bugaj's idea of turning the UP into a party which would be "above divisions."

However, one should not be surprised at Bugaj's troubles, since "the elite of the elites," that is, activists of the UW, must also explain to one another what party activity means.

Last Sunday Jan Maria Rokita was expelled from the party's presidium for disloyalty. Bronislaw Komorowski, who resigned his membership in the UW leadership to protest Rokita's expulsion, signed a list supporting Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz before the elections, and did it in front of journalists. "However, I also signed a list of support for Jacek Kuron," Komorowski said at that time, which reportedly made SLD activists laugh. Jan Maria Rokita, in turn, said publicly that he did not know whom he should vote for in the elections, even though his party had decided to endorse Kuron much earlier. "How can the party say that it is opening up to the right and expel Rokita at the same time?" asked on Sunday Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who even at the time when he was the party's chairman complained that Barbara Labuda and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk attacked him in public. Now he claims that expulsion of Rokita will make it impossible to reach an agreement with the right wing and that this has pushed the UW to the left. "By presenting such an alternative, Tadeusz Mazowiecki shows his disloyalty," assessed Michal Boni, former chief of Jacek Kuron's campaign staff. "I asked Chancellor Kohl how a modern party is formed. He replied that only 3 percent is due to spectacular actions and the remainder are discipline, good organization, and promotion," said Leszek Balcerowicz when he decided to take disciplinary action.

By imposing discipline in the party and by announcing creation of a platform alternative to the SLD, Balcerowicz is trying to protect the party from taking over the anticommunist rhetoric, which is used by the extreme right wing and which does not seem to interest most of the people, just like disputes of the past. Even though it is calling upon the SLD to free itself of the "burden of the past," the opposition itself is not free of it, which is proved by the expectation that the SLD leaders will relinquish control over the three "presidential" ministries to "trustworthy" persons, that is, to persons who were not PZPR members in the past. Meanwhile, as the elections showed, this criterion is not very important to 9 million citizens.

However, how should the platform of the moderate opposition differ from the government platform?

"The SLD has many faces, which makes our task difficult," says UW Deputy Chairman Tadeusz Syryjczyk, adding: "In fact, there are no openly antimarket or antidemocratic parties. For this reason, it is difficult to look at a platform which envisages protection of the free market or democracy. Disputes are confined to the scope of state interventions or the scope to which monetary policy should be employed. However, disputes over the widening of the state deficit are already a thing of the past."

Now, preparing a platform is not enough. During his campaign, Jacek Kuron drew up his "Report for Poland." Nonetheless, few people read it. Activists of the moderate right wing tend to believe that voters do nothing else but avidly study thick platform brochures. Another task that leaders must carry out during a campaign is to successfully "sell" their platform. The UW showed two faces: Jacek Kuron and Jan Maria Rokita. Balcerowicz's face was nowhere to be seen.

"Politicians on our side of the political scene are too great individualists, whereas we should try to find a new leader," says UW Deputy Jan Krol. It has already dawned upon some opposition activists that Aleksander Kwasniewski must be confronted with an equally eloquent, modern politician. "Another Kwasniewski may be, for example, Andrzej Olechowski, who, for the time being, chairs the minor One Hundred Movement." "Let us not try to find a charismatic leader at all costs," appeals Aleksander Hall. Thus, it can be expected that the parties will find a leader, "but not at all costs," at the end of Aleksander Kwasniewski's term. "It is not our opponents, but ourselves that I hold responsible for

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the failure of the Solidarity camp," says Jan Krol. "Our opponents recover quickly and soon they win more elections. Is it now that we are going to wait for our victory in a few dozen years, just like the Republicans in the United States?"

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Melescanu Statement on Leaving for Peace Conference

AU1312132295 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 13 Dec 95

[Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu before leaving Bucharest for Paris Peace Conference on Bosnia—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] My attending the Paris conference actually pursues two principal objectives: On the one hand, as a country lying in the vicinity of the conflict region, Romania has been invited to attend, or rather, to be more precise, to assist at the signing of the Paris peace accords. I believe that this came as an acknowledgment of our contribution, and, generally, of the contribution Romania can also bring in the future to ensure the reconstruction of the former Yugoslav space and stability in that region.

On the other hand, on this occasion there will also be a first discussion on how to act to expand, let me put it this way, the Stability Pact, as they call it, to the area of former Yugoslavia as well. The idea is to launch, together with the other parties attending the conference, an action allowing further negotiations between the former Yugoslav republics, on the basis, I repeat, of the principles of the Stability Pact, to ensure stability in that region. What is intended here is to organize regional roundtable conferences, of the kind also held among Central European and Baltic countries, as well as to encourage bilateral negotiations between the various former Yugoslav republics to create a juridical framework for their relations.

No doubt, in our opinion, too, this exercise of expanding the Stability Pact has a particular importance. It is intended to offer a solid basis for the future implementation of the Dayton accords. So we hope it to be, as its name also indicates, an important contribution to stability in that region.

We also wish to obtain the acknowledgment of the fact that Romania, together with other countries, namely Hungary and Bulgaria, are countries that were most affected by the embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro, the new Yugoslav Federation, and consequently we expect, within the efforts currently being made, the acknowledgment of the special role these countries should play in the reconstruction process. We hope that this request of ours should be concretely given course by the end of this month in Brussels, where a first conference will take place organized by the European Union, on the issue of the reconstruction, as well as the contribution of various countries to the reconstruction process. We have already received certain signals that Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria will be invited to attend those talks.

Cabinet Meeting Examines Economic Issues

AU1212205195 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's working meeting, the cabinet finalized and adopted a draft law on allowing the government to issue ordinances for the duration of the parliamentary vacation.

Regarding the implementation of the privatization program, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu said that the Senate is currently examining a legislative initiative to extend the deadline for the application of Law No. 55/1995, meaning to extend by three months the deadline for the registration and depositing of unused ownership bonds with the Private Property Funds.

The government also examined and approved the strategy for the development of tourism in the medium term, for the 1996-2000 period. Then, the government adopted a draft law on Romania's adherence to the international convention on harmonizing the systems for the naming and codifying of commodities, a convention concluded in Brussels in 1983. This convention, which is observed in 75 countries, aims at simplifying and standardizing trade documents, accelerating the transmission of data, and reducing expenses for classifying and codifying goods.

The cabinet also approved the national program on legislative harmonization of the domestic market, which is an essential component part of the national strategy for preparing Romania's adherence to the EU.

Through a decision issued today, the government approved the supplementation and modification of certain provisions regarding the organization and functioning of the National Privatization Agency. The cabinet also issued a decision on certain changes in the rules on compensating retail prices of essential medicines for ambulatory human treatment.

The government decided that the Christmas days 25-26 December 1995 and the New Year's days 1-2 January 1996 should be nonworking days.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Interior, Defense Ministries' Budgets 'Disastrous'

AU1212172395 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 7 Dec 95 p 8

[Report by Marcela Feraru: "The Interior Ministry and Ministry of National Defense Leaderships Lamented the Disastrous Situation in Those Ministries"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, in the presence of the Interior Ministry and Ministry of National Defense leaderships, the Chamber of Deputies Defense Committee debated the budgets allotted to those ministries in next year's national budget. The conclusion of the discussions was that the situation in the case of both ministries is disastrous.

The Interior Ministry Does Not Even Have Enough Money for Food

Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila showed up before the committee accompanied by the entire leading staff in his ministry. He asserted that he is totally dissatisfied with the allotted budget and, despite the fact that he put up a fight, doing his best at the government meetings, his colleagues would not understand him. The situation he presented to the defense panel gives reason for concern. In order to receive a budget merely to survive, the funds allotted to the Interior Ministry should be increased by at least 500 billion lei [L].

Furthermore, Minister Taracila pointed out that he has no more money left for his ministry to run until the end of this year, by which he meant that he has no funds left to ensure even their food. The supplementation of the budget, in any way, was denied by the members of the panel, but a compromise solution was suggested by PD [Democratic Party] Deputy Nicolae Alexandru, who proposed that a proportion of 25 percent (that is, L50 billion) resulting from the fines and property confiscations performed by the police should go to the ministry. In order to avoid encouraging abuse, such funds will be allocated from the state budget. This amendment was then accepted.

The Army Will Resort to the Mobilization Stocks

The Defense Ministry was represented at the panel meeting by Ioan Mircea Pascu, state secretary, accompanied by the leading staff of the ministry. The Army representatives revealed the fact that their situation is so critical that they will have to resort to the mobilization stocks (stocks kept for the event of a war). The combat readiness of the combat vehicles is very low, as 60 percent of the combat vehicle fleet are currently nonoperational. Despite all the official declarations, nothing has been done to modernize the combat equipment and, as far as interoperativeness is concerned (that is, becoming compatible with NATO combat equipment), the degree that was reached does not exceed 15 percent. The Defense Ministry requested that its budget should be supplemented by L400 billion, but this request was not even taken into consideration. Under such circumstances, next year pilots, for instance, will be able to perform a mere six flight hours, at the most, for training.

What is worse is that, besides the L150 billion that was taken from the Defense Ministry by cutting its 1995 budget, another L150 billion of its funds has been blocked. According to Defense Ministry calculations, in order to keep the Army operational until the year 2005, they would need $400 million.

Once again, it was Deputy Nicolae Alexandru who managed to have an amendment passed, which supplements the army budget by L600 billion either from the $3 billion foreign debt ceiling, as passed by Parliament for 1996, or by augmenting that foreign debt ceiling by the equivalent of the aforementioned L600 billion.

In the end, the Defense Ministry obtained a budget amounting to L2.399 trillion, of which L1.9595 trillion was earmarked for defense-related expenses.

Iliescu Urges Nation to 'Unity' on National Day

AU1312113595 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 7 Dec p 3

["Message Sent by Romania's President Ion Iliescu to Participants in the National Day Festivities in Alba Iulia, 1 December 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There were good grounds for making 1 December Romania's National Day. On 1 December 1918, the most ardent wish of our people was fulfilled, namely, the unification of all Romanians within the borders of the same national state. An outstanding event, the Great Union of 1 December 1918 marks a profound point in our historical development.

1 December represents a brilliant crowning of the century-old struggle of the Romanians to achieve their national unity. The Romanian nation, which has uninterruptedly inhabited the geographic hearth on which it still finds itself today, directed all its basic actions toward achieving this holy ideal, which has throbbed for centuries on end in the soul of all Romanians, an ideal passed over from generation to generation and gradually fortified by an ardent sentiment of unity and an outstanding national awareness.

On the 77th anniversary of this glorious day, which was proclaimed Romania's National Day, we express our admiration for the wisdom and clearsightedness of the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

generation, which achieved the unification. At a time when empires were falling apart and everything seemed to be on the point of disintegration, the Romanians knew how to raise the banner of their dear ideal, by uttering and fulfilling their century-long desire: "We want to unite with the country."

I would like to particularly emphasize these lessons today, when we are again experiencing a favorable moment for asserting our creative potential and for moving along the road of development and modernization. In taking over the democratic message of the national idea, we are aware of the fact that the future of the Romanian nation and of its united state depends on the quality of the our actions today and on the results we will achieve in the process of transition. It is our duty to preserve and consolidate the assets inherited from our parents and forefathers and to ensure—through top performances and lasting progress—that Romania enjoys the benefits of contemporary and future civilization, thus taking up the place it deserves in the contemporary world.

Through efforts, good organization, and cooperation and dialogue among the society's forces, we can consolidate the positive trends in our economic life, accelerate the pace of reform, and relaunch our economic and social development in a thorough and lasting way, which can offer prospects and hopes for each social category and for the country as a whole.

In our domestic policy, we may have different views on the country's development programs, but on basic issues we are dutybound to remain attached to the oath handed down by our predecessors, namely, to safeguard the unity of the national state, the perennial values of democracy and freedom, and those beliefs that confirm our identity and express our people's moral and cultural stature.

I take this opportunity to emphasize the vital importance of the country's modern development along the line of the ideals that have accompanied our historical evolution. The country's development and modernization as well as its integration in the European structures are a true national priority. In order to attain this goal, we must know, just as the 1918 generation knew, how to cooperate and remove the sources of artificial discord and how to consolidate our achievements to date. We must adjust our actions to the currents of the time and the new tides of civilization.

On the National Day, I urge you, the inhabitants of the citadel of our eternity, and all Romania's citizens to have trust in the country's reconstruction and to support, each one according to his own forces, this heroic effort of raising Romania to the modern foundations of democracy and of the rule-of-law state.

UDMR Reclaims Confiscated Church Property

AU1212125995 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 6 Dec 95 p 1

[Article by Cristian Mihai Chis: "The UDMR Reclaims 180,000 Hectares, 1,041 Schools, and 1,700 Vicarages"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday at noon, at the Unitarian Bishopric in Cluj, the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] launched the book titled *We Demand What Is Due to Us*, in a multilingual (Hungarian, Romanian, German, English, and French) edition. The book was edited by the UDMR Department for Cultural and Religious Issues. The event in Cluj was attended by Csaba Takacs (executive president) and Bishop Laszlo Tokes (honorary president). The UDMR executive president made the following statement to the press: "By confiscating the land owned by the traditional Hungarian churches, by means of the 1921 agrarian reform, they inaugurated the assimilation of the Hungarian ethnic minority. The reform robbed the aforementioned churches of 80 percent of the 180,000 hectares of land they owned in 1921. Later on, by Government Decision 160 of 1948 they confiscated the remaining land owned by the Hungarian churches, as well as 1,041 schools, 28 youth hostels, 17 hospitals, 1,760 vicarages, 62 buildings that were historic monuments, as well as two palaces."

The aforementioned book offends the Romanian nation by the words of Jozsef Koto, UDMR vice president: "This is the echoing voice of a national community that was robbed and defrauded even of its rights." In the book, Pal Reizer, the Satu Mare bishop, attacks President Ion Iliescu, accusing that he was the first person [after December 1989] to utter the word "separatism" in connection with the Hungarian ethnics living in Transylvania.

Present at the launching of the book, Reformed Bishop Tokes made the following statement to the press: "The Education Bill is a rip-off law, which again steals from us the things stolen by the communists; if the law is implemented, we will never be able to get back our Hungarian denominational schools." The Orthodox believers are overwhelmed by government donations, they are given numerous buildings, whereas we do not get back even what belongs to us.

It should be noted, though, that the Hungarian churches in Transylvania used to own land by treading the Romanian ethnic majority underfoot.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

PSM Head: Quadripartite Accord Never Functioned

AU1112183695 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 11 Dec 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's weekly news conference of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], President Ilie Verdet referred to relations between the PSM and the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] and reiterated that the quadripartite protocol [between the PDSR, PSM, the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR, and the Greater Romania Party—PRM] was nil, because it had never functioned. At the same time, he emphasized that the PSM had not participated in the government and had only lent political support to the PDSR. This protocol, Verdet said, will remain as a political failure in Romania's history.

Answering questions from journalists, the PSM president said that the Romanian Workers Party [Partidul Muncitoresc Roman], as a left-wing party, could be viewed as a possible ally for the next elections.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Federal

Interior Minister on Kosovo, Foreign Espionage

AU1212141695 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 4 Dec 95 p 2

[Interview with Vukasin Jokanovic, minister of internal affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by Tatjana M. Tomasevic; place and date not given: "Kosovo and Metohija Are Also Stable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In Kosovo and Metohija, the situation is still complex, and this represents a long-term problem for Serbia and Yugoslavia. Yet, all the basic preconditions exist for a permanent and complete incorporation of Kosovo and Metohija in all the processes that are taking place in Serbia, of which these provinces are an inseparable part. And the measures that have been taken in the past few years, both for the preservation of public peace and order and for the consolidation of the economy, have brought visible results.

Further, explaining the security situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the federal minister of internal affairs, Vukasin Jokanovic, says that "the leaders of Albanian secessionism are persistently and constantly trying to establish their own parallel institutions and organs, for which considerable funds are collected in the country and abroad." One part of that money, as Jokanovic points out, originates from international drug smuggling.

[Tomasevic] Does the parallel school system in Kosovo and Metohija still operate?

[Jokanovic] Unfortunately, the separatists, like prisoners of their own policy, are still persistent in having a parallel school system, which is organized according to their own programs, in illegal elementary and secondary schools, and even at universities. There were some attempts to form illegal organs of internal affairs and defense commands, but these were severed by appropriate measures of security organs and of the judiciary. However, the particular nervousness among the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija was caused by the opinions expressed in public by crucial elements in the international community that the problems must be solved within Serbia and Yugoslavia. The struggle for an independent Kosovo has no chances of success, and, in fact, the majority of Albanians are aware of that. What I have to add is that in Kosovo and Metohija people have never stopped contacting and talking to each other, while the division that was present has become considerably smaller than before.

[Tomasevic] One police patrol has recently been attacked in that region again.

[Jokanovic] The recent armed attacks on the members of the interior ministry are the deeds of those who believe in radical methods. Those moves are designed to created tension, and in the first place to draw the attention of the domestic and international public. I wish to stress that, despite all the problems, since 1990 there have been no mass forms of violence, and the number of conflicts between the nations has been significantly reduced. On the whole, public peace and order have been preserved, which was decisively influenced by the engagement of state organs and institutions, but also of citizens themselves. In the realization of their rights, all citizens of Kosovo and Metohija are equal. That is why violence and terrorism will still be entirely suppressed, in order to protect the safety of all the citizens, regardless of their ethnicity and religion. All other talks are nothing but well-thought-out propaganda.

Our long-term goal is to stabilize the situation in this part of Serbia, and to separate the Albanian population from the separatist movement, because even those Albanians who would wish to realize their constitutional rights are being exposed to pressure, intimidation, threats and attacks from the extremists.

[Tomasevic] To what extent is Yugoslavia today an object of interest of foreign intelligence agencies?

The Intensity of Espionage Has Not Slackened

[Jokanovic] The entire territory of both the former and the present Yugoslavia has always been an object of intense interest to foreign intelligence agencies, in the first place because of its geopolitical position and the interests of great powers. Although many things have changed—from the disappearance of bipolarity in international relations to the secession and war in the former Yugoslav republics—the intensity of the activities of foreign intelligence agencies concerning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has remained the same. Their intention is to influence the political, military, economic, and social processes in our country, which should be such as to favor the realization of some of their interests. That is why a wide variety of activities is used toward Yugoslavia: From classical intelligence work, including the "legal" methods of collecting information, and the possibilities that modern technology offers, to various forms of subversive action. I wish to point out that we have sufficiently effective state mechanisms to counteract such activities and to undermine all forms of subversive action from abroad and from within the country.

[Tomasevic] To what degree has the arrival of a large number of refugees influenced public peace and order in the country, and to what degree has increased unemployment influenced it?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Jokanovic] As for the public peace and order in Yugoslavia, it can be seen as stable despite the circumstances in which we live. Looking at it as a whole, one could not say that the refugees or the unemployed represent a serious factor that destabilizes such a situation. It is a fact, however, that the sanctions and the war in the neighborhood have made the social position of the citizens of Yugoslavia drastically worse, so that the people who have no employment, and the refugees from the war areas, have come into a particularly difficult situation. In such an economic and social atmosphere, it was realistic to expect the appearance of a gray economy, of smuggling, and of various forms of crime. I expect, however, that the situation will normalize in times of peace and after the sanctions have been lifted

Peace Is the Most Effective Way

[Tomasevic] According to the data of the republic's public prosecutors and according to the statistical data, during the last five years there has been an increase of crime in Serbia and Montenegro. A network of crime has been created and is increasingly better organized—from the smuggling of weapons and drugs to the illegal printing and dispersal of money. In your opinion, what is it that has decisively influenced its growth, and what effects has the fight against crime had in Yugoslavia up to now?

[Jokanovic] The growth of crime that you mentioned has been caused by all that we had to face in the last few years: The forceful secession of the parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, war in the neighborhood, international sanctions, increased unemployment, mass immigration into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the war areas, illegal possession of weapons....The biggest component of the crime committed is related to property offenses—misuse of the transformation of property in the economy, organized smuggling, corruption, all the way up to the classical offenses targeted at the private property of citizens. What has a particular resonance in the public is an increased number of criminal deeds that include the use of weapons and violence. Yet, despite all the difficulties, it can be said that the organs of internal affairs in Yugoslavia are managing to fight the increase in crime successfully. What speaks for that is the data that has been disclosed about the criminal deeds committed in the last year which, as is shown by the statistical data, indicates the increased effectiveness of the interior ministry's work. According to the data I possess, the same tendency has continued this year.

[Box, p 2]

Citizenship

[Tomasevic] There have been many calculations in the public concerning ways of solving the problem of refugees, particularly those who arrived from Krajina in the last exodus. Will it be possible to give them Yugoslav citizenship, if they so decide, or will they be given international status as refugees?

[Jokanovic] When it comes to the refugees from the Republic of Serb Krajina, and generally, to all those who in the past four years have fled from the war areas into Yugoslavia, it should be expected that their status will be permanently solved within the global peace agreements for the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I hope that conditions will be created for some of these fellow Serbs to return to the place where they lived before. As for the others, those who fulfill the basic conditions will receive Yugoslav citizenship, according to the provisions of the future law on citizenship.

[Box, p 2]

"Revision"

[Tomasevic] In your opinion, after the federal parliament adopts the proposed law on citizenship, how much time will be needed for the revision of previously solved cases, bearing in mind that it [the law] anticipates that all those who have been given the citizenship of Serbia and Montenegro in the period from 27 April 1992 to date will now have to submit another application for citizenship?

[Jokanovic] Concerning the renewed submitting of applications by those who have already received positive answers and were awarded the citizenship after 27 April 1992, I wish to say that the so-called revision that you mentioned will, in fact, only mean that the citizenship status of those people will have to be brought in accordance with the provisions of the federal law. No one who fulfills the conditions listed in the new law—if it is passed as such at all—and who has become a citizen of one of the republics in a legal way, will be deprived of Yugoslav citizenship.

[Box, p 2]

Without Any Major Incidents

[Tomasevic] How do you interpret the fact that, despite the war in our neighborhood and the resulting tragic conflicts between nations, the complex national structure in Yugoslavia has remained proportionally similar to the structure that existed before the war?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Jokanovic] Although our country is multinational, since 1990 we have had no major incidents on the basis of ethnicity. The constitutional arrangement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is based on the notion of citizen, and not on ethnicity, and that is where the policy of ethnic equality comes from. Individual incidents that have occurred, like the case of threats in some villages of Srem in the course of 1992 and 1993, or the kidnapping of the passengers at the Strpci railway station, cannot change the complete picture and the general evaluation of the situation. Despite the columns of refugees that have come to Yugoslavia, nobody has been expelled from here nor does anybody have any reason to move from Serbia or Montenegro.

Serbia

Orthodox Church Warns of Mass Exodus From Bosnia

AU1212215195 Paris AFP in English 1903 GMT 12 Dec 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec 12 (AFP)—The Serb Orthodox church called on the international community Tuesday [12 December] to brace for a mass exodus of Bosnian Serbs, the independent FONET news agency reported.

During a meeting of its governing synod in Belgrade on Tuesday, the church broadly welcomed the Bosnia-Hercegovina peace accords, but said it was "worried" for Serbs living in areas to come under Moslem-Croat control.

"If the world really hopes to find a just solution for all the parties in the conflict, it should provide for the massive exodus of the Serb people," the church said.

"Otherwise, the ethnic cleansing of Serbs begun in Slavonia (Croatia) and brutally pursued in Krajina (Croatia) and in western Bosnia, will assume proportions never attained in the history of Europe."

Serbs living in Sarajevo suburbs held a referendum Tuesday to reject the terms of the peace accord initialled in Dayton, Ohio last month, and set for definitive signing in Paris on Thursday.

Under the accord, the suburbs will come under the authority of the Moslem-Croat federation.

In Geneva, the spiritual leader of the world's 300 million Greek Orthodox Christians, Bartholomeo I, said the Bosnian peace process was at a critical juncture.

The patriarch, who has been on an official visit to Switzerland since Friday, told reporters he welcomed the Dayton accords and prayed that the Paris signing would lead to "a solid and lasting peace."

Referring to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia by Serbs claiming to be Orthodox, Bartholomeo said: "The Orthodox church categorically condemns all forms of violence or terrorism or fanaticism."

He added that the church had repeatedly expressed its disagreement with the Serb authorities.

Commentary on Plans To Build New 'Serb Sarajevo'

AU1312092895 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 95 p 6

[Commentary by Mirko Klarin: "Builders of an Ethnic Ghetto"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the architects of the Dayton accords really believe in what they have designed (for instance, that Bosnia should remain unified and that all its citizens should have full freedom of movement and be guaranteed the highest degree of protection of their human and national rights), then it is senseless to insist that the citizens of the so-called Serb Sarajevo should be given some particular guarantees. By the way, nobody is demanding such uarantees for the approximately same number of Serbs in Sarajevo proper, that is, the part of the city under the government control, who, in the years of incessant shelling, had no guarantees that they would not be killed by the artillery of their fellow nationals from the surrounding hills. In the same way, nobody is demanding any special guarantees for the Muslims or Croats in the regions under Serb control. For instance, in Banja Luka, where, despite intensive ethnic cleansing, a few tens of thousands of them still remain (of the roughly half a million who used to live in the broader area of Banja Luka in 1992).

If the signatories of the Dayton accords really intend to fulfill the commitments they assumed by signing it (or more precisely, by initialing it, for the time being), then the plans to build a "new Serb Sarajevo" are even more senseless. Biljana Plavsic was the first to announce these plans after Dayton, revealing that the promise to build a new city for 120,000 citizens was the price that Serbia, that is the FRY, paid for Karadzic's initials on the peace document at the post-Dayton meeting in Dobanovci.

The price is undoubtedly high, so it is understandable that the chief of the Yugoslav diplomatic corps, Milan Milutinovic, tried to transfer it to the international community last weekend in London, asking it to help with material means and in any other sense the possible construction of a new Serb Sarajevo. Although financially understandable, the invitation is politically quite unreasonable and counterproductive. Perhaps it would be possible to find somebody who would agree to be a

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

cofinancier of such a huge building project, but it is out of the question that anybody would be ready to cooperate in the construction of a new ethnic ghetto, which would negate the very essence of the Dayton accords.

That essence was briefly defined by Carl Bildt, also in London, when he warned that the departure of the Sarajevo Serbs would mean the collapse of the vision of a unified, multinational Sarajevo and an integral, multiethnic Bosnia. However, what one sides considers to be a warning against the threat of collapse, is considered by the other side an alluring promise that a collapse is still possible, despite all.

Montenegro

'Warmongering Propaganda' by Pale TV Criticized

AU1212213695 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 95 p 6

[Article by "V.K.": "We Have a Lion's Heart..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale television, whose programs can also be seen in a large part of the commune of Niksic [Montenegro], has for years been successful in its warmongering propaganda and the station continues it even after the Dayton agreement was concluded. A good example was the program "Dobar dan, Srpska" ["Good Afternoon, (Republika) Srpska"] broadcast during the latest state holiday of the nonexisting state, in which demonstrations held in Ilijas and Pale dedicated to the defense of "Serbian Sarajevo" were shown in detail. Militant speakers at the demonstrations—in which masses of elementary school pupils also participated, most probably because they were given an order by the Pale leadership—insisted on century-long Serbian roots, on Kosovo, the Orthodoxy, and their new home country—just like during the time when the most fierce war was waged in this area. They swore that they would not give up Sarajevo, and there were also curses addressed to Turks and ustashas.

A special characteristic of the program were new patriotic songs and singers dressed in camouflage suits. Judging by the happy faces of the program hosts, who still speak the perfect Bosnian Serb dialect, the most popular song is the one with the refrain: "Pashas, Ustashas stay where you are, we defend what is ours; we have a lion's heart, we defend Orthodoxy."

Vojvodina

Associations Sign Manifesto Calling For Autonomy

AU1312113895 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 95 p 11

[Article by B. Lazukic: "Return of Identity and Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following the initiative by, and under the sponsorship of, the Vojvodina Club (a nonparty organization), the Manifesto for an Autonomous Vojvodina was signed in Novi Sad the day before yesterday [6 December]. The key requirement is to start the constitutional procedure for the change of the Constitution of Serbia and Yugoslavia that should enable Vojvodina to be constituted as an autonomous multinational community of free and equal citizens within the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The act was signed by 17 representatives of political, nongovernmental, and professional associations of Vojvodina: The Banat Forum from Pancevo, The Ethnic Forum from Subotica, The Citizens' Coalition for Subotica, The Association for the Truth About the Liberation War [World War II] from Novi Sad, The European Citizens's Center for Settlement of Conflicts from Subotica, the Citizens' Movement for Subotica "Golubovi Subotice," The League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, the People's Peasants Party, The Independent Association of Journalists of Vojvodina, The Group of Independent Deputies to the Vojvodina Assembly, New Democracy—the North Backa Regional Committee, The Movement for Peace in Vojvodina, The All-National Democratic Front of Vojvodina, The Vojvodina Party from Zrenjanin, The Vojvodina Club From Novi Sad, The Humanitarian Society "Panonija," and The United Unions "Nezavisnost" from Novi Sad. [passage omitted]

It is foreseen in the document that Vojvodina should be given its autonomous legislative, judicial, and executive power in the fields it is in charge of. These rights should be permanently guaranteed by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since Vojvodina is a constituent part of it within the Republic of Serbia.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.